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U.S. v. Booker
(04-104)
Ruling Below: (U.S. v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 7th Cir. 2004)
At sentencing, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant: (1) had
distributed 566 grams over and above the 92.5 grams found by the jury and (2) had obstructed
justice. Defendant's appeal challenged the sentence on the ground that the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (Guidelines) violated the Sixth Amendment insofar as they permitted the
judge to find facts that determined defendant's sentencing range. The court held: (1) the
application of the Guidelines in defendant's case violated the Sixth Amendment because it
limited defendant's right to have a jury determine, using the reasonable-doubt standard, how
much cocaine base he possessed and whether he obstructed justice; (2) in cases where there were
no enhancements-that is, no factual findings by a judge increasing a sentence-there was no
constitutional violation in applying the Guidelines unless the Guidelines were invalid in their
entirety; and (3) if the Guidelines were severable, the judge could use a sentencing jury; if not,
he could choose any sentence between 10 years and life and, in making the latter determination,
he was free to draw on the Guidelines for recommendations.
Questions Presented:
1. Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence under
the United States Sentencing Guidelines based on the sentencing judge's determination of a fact
(other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.
2. If the answer to the first question is "yes," the following question is presented: whether, in a
case in which the Guidelines would require the court to find a sentence-enhancing fact, the
Sentencing Guidelines as a whole would be inapplicable, as a matter of severability analysis,
such that the sentencing court must exercise its discretion to sentence the defendant within the
maximum and minimum set by statute for the offense of conviction.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee
V.
FREDDIE J. BOOKER, Appellant
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Decided July 9, 2004
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
POSNER, Circuit Judge:
A jury found the defendant guilty of statute prescribes a minimum sentence of 10
possessing with intent to distribute at least years in prison and a maximum sentence of
50 grams of cocaine base, for which the life. At sentencing, the judge found by a
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preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant had distributed 566 grams over
and above the 92.5 grams that the jury had
to have found. [...J Under the federal
sentencing guidelines, the additional
quantity finding increased the defendant's
base offense level from 32 to 36, [with t]he
effect, together with that of the enhancement
that the guidelines prescribe for obstruction
of justice, was to place the defendant in a
sentencing range of 360 months to life. The
judge sentenced him to the bottom of the
range. The appeal challenges the sentence
on the ground that the sentencing guidelines
violate the Sixth Amendment insofar as they
permit the judge to find facts (other than
facts relating to a defendant's criminal
history) that determine the defendant's
sentencing range. [...]
We have expedited our decision in an effort
to provide some guidance to the district
judges (and our own court's staff), who are
faced with an avalanche of motions for
resentencing in the light of Blakely v.
Washington, which has cast a long shadow
over the federal sentencing guidelines. We
cannot of course provide definitive
guidance; only the Court and Congress can
do that; our hope is that an early opinion
will help speed the issue to a definitive
resolution.
The Supreme Court had already held that
"other than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." In
Blakely it let the other shoe drop and held
over pointed dissents that "the 'statutory
maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in
the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant." "In other words, the relevant
'statutory maximum' is not the maximum
sentence a judge may impose after finding
additional facts, but the maximum he may
impose without any additional findings.
When a judge inflicts punishment that the
jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury
has not found all the facts 'which the law
makes essential to the punishment,' and the
judge exceeds his proper authority."
"Without" is italicized in the original; we
have italicized "relevant" to underscore the
difference between the maximum sentence
in the statute, and the maximum sentence-
what the Supreme Court regards as the
"relevant statutory maximum"-that the
judge can impose without making his own
findings, above and beyond what the jury
found or the defendant admitted or, as here,
did not contest.
The maximum sentence that the district
judge could have imposed in this case
(without an upward departure), had he not
made any findings concerning quantity of
drugs or obstruction of justice, would have
been 262 months, given the defendant's base
offense level of 32 (32 is the base offense
level when the defendant possessed at least
50 grams but less than 150 grams of crack),
and the defendant's criminal history. True,
that maximum is imposed not by the words
of a federal statute, but by the sentencing
guidelines. Provisions of the guidelines
establish a "standard range" for possessing
with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of
cocaine base, and other provisions of the
guidelines establish aggravating factors that
if found by the judge jack up the range. The
pattern is the same as that in the Washington
statute, and it is hard to believe that the fact
that the guidelines are promulgated by the
U.S. Sentencing Commission rather than by
a legislature can make a difference. The
Commission is exercising power delegated
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to it by Congress, and if a legislature cannot
evade what the Supreme Court deems the
commands of the Constitution by a
multistage sentencing scheme neither, it
seems plain, can a regulatory agency. [ ...]
It would seem to follow, therefore, as the
four dissenting Justices in Blakely warned,
and several district judges have already
ruled, that Blakely dooms the guidelines
insofar as they require that sentences be
based on facts found by a judge. The
majority in Blakely, faced with dissenting
opinions that as much as said that the
decision doomed the federal sentencing
guidelines, might have said, no it doesn't; it
did not say that.
The qualification "based on facts found by a
judge" is critical. Nothing in Blakely
suggests that Congress cannot delegate to
the Sentencing Commission the authority to
decree that possession with intent to
distribute 658.5 grams of cocaine base shall
be punished by a sentence of at least 360
months though the statutory minimum is
only 10 years. All it cannot do under
Blakely is take away from the defendant the
right to demand that the quantity be
determined by the jury rather than by the
judge, and on the basis of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. The government argues
that all the guidelines do is regularize the
discretion that judges would exercise in
picking a sentence within a statutory range.
If that were indeed all, that would be fine.
And indeed to a great extent the system of
the guidelines, with its sentencing ranges
and upward and downward departures,
limits rather than extinguishes sentencing
discretion. But the issue in Blakely was not
sentencing discretion-it was the authority of
the sentencing judge to find the facts that
determine how that discretion shall be
implemented and to do so on the basis of
only the civil burden of proof. The vices of
the guidelines are thus that they require the
sentencing judge to make findings of fact
(and to do so under the wrong standard of
proof), and that the judge's findings largely
determine the sentence, given the limits on
upward and downward departures. The
finding of facts (other than the fact of the
defendant's criminal history) bearing on the
length of the sentence is just what the
Supreme Court in Blakely has determined to
be the province of the jury.
We conclude that Booker has a right to have
the jury determine the quantity of drugs he
possessed and the facts underlying the
determination that he obstructed justice. The
judgment must therefore be reversed and the
case remanded for resentencing. If the
government does not object, the judge can
simply sentence Booker to 262 months,
since the choice of that sentence would not
require any judicial factfinding. But if the
government wants a higher sentence or
unless, as explained below, the guidelines
are not severable, then Booker, unless he
strikes a deal with the government, will be
entitled to a sentencing hearing at which a
jury will have to find by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt the facts on which a higher
sentence would be premised. There is no
novelty in a separate jury trial with regard to
the sentence, just as there is no novelty in a
bifurcated jury trial, in which the jury first
determines liability and then, if and only if it
finds liability, determines damages. Separate
hearings before a jury on the issue of
sentence is the norm in capital cases.
To summarize: (1) The application of the
guidelines in this case violated the Sixth
Amendment as interpreted in Blakely; (2) in
cases where there are no enhancements -that
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is, no factual findings by the judge
increasing the sentence-there is no
constitutional violation in applying the
guidelines unless the guidelines are invalid
in their entirety; (3) we do not decide the
severability of the guidelines, and so that is
an issue for consideration on remand should
it be made an issue by the parties; (4) if the
guidelines are severable, the judge can use a
sentencing jury; if not, he can choose any
sentence between 10 years and life and in
making the latter determination he is free to
draw on the guidelines for recommendations
as he sees fit; (5) as a matter of prudence,
the judge should in any event select a
nonguidelines alternative sentence.
Reversed and remanded.
DISSENT; EASTERBROOK,
Judge:
Circuit
Now to substance. [...] Blakely arose from a
need to designate one of two statutes as the
"statutory maximum." Washington called its
statutes "sentencing guidelines," but names
do not change facts. Nonetheless, the
reading my colleagues give to this passage is
that it does not matter whether the maximum
is statutory; any legal rule, of any source
(statute, regulation, guideline) that affects a
sentence must go to a jury. Certainly
Blakely does not hold that; it could not
"hold" that given that it dealt with statutes
exclusively. Attributing to Blakely the view
that it does not matter whether a given rule
appears in a statute makes hash of "statutory
maximum." Why did the Justices deploy
that phrase in Apprendi and repeat it in
Blakely (and quite a few other decisions)?
Just to get a chuckle at the expense of other
judges who took them seriously and thought
that "statutory maximum" might have
something to do with statutes? Why write
"statutory maximum" if you mean "all
circumstances that go into ascertaining the
proper sentence"?
Going Blakely one better, today's majority
says that as a matter of constitutional law
there cannot be any difference between
statutes and other sources of rules: "it is hard
to believe that the fact that the guidelines are
promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission rather than by a legislature can
make a difference. The Commission is
exercising power delegated to it by
Congress, and if a legislature cannot evade
what the Supreme Court deems the
commands of the Constitution by a
multistage sentencing scheme neither, it
seems plain, can a regulatory agency." For
the vital proposition that anything
functionally equivalent to a statute (from the
perspective of a criminal defendant) must be
treated as a statute, the majority cites-
nothing. Phrases such as "it seems plain" are
poor substitutes for authority in the
Constitution's text or interpretive history.
The majority's proposition is refuted by
Blakely itself, which tells us that legislatures
may delegate such issues to the judiciary
and parole boards without offending the
sixth amendment. The Court considered
whether there would be a constitutional
problem with open-ended sentencing, such
as a statute allowing any person convicted of
burglary to be sentenced to any term of
years up to 40. If the law left that decision to
the judiciary, the court said, there would be
no problem even if the sentencing judge
applied (as a matter of common law) the rule
"10 years unless the burglar uses a gun; if a
gun, then 40 years." Put that algorithm in a
statute and the sixth amendment commits to
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the jury the question whether the burglar
was armed; put the same algorithm in a
judicial opinion and the sixth amendment
allows the judge to make the decision. The
Court saw this not as an "evasion" but as a
natural application of the Constitution.
Apprendi and Blakely hold that the sixth
amendment commits to juries all statutory
sentencing thresholds. Perhaps the Court
eventually will hold that some or all of the
additional determinations that affect
sentences under the federal Sentencing
Guidelines also are the province of jurors.
But Blakely does not take that step, nor does
its intellectual framework support it-and
Edwards holds that the current structure is
valid provided that juries make all decisions
that jack the maximum sentences. I would
treat Blakely as holding that, when there are
multiple statutory caps, the "statutory
maximum" is the lowest one and the jury
must determine whether statutory thresholds
to increased ranges have been satisfied. To
read more into Blakely is to attribute to that
opinion something beyond its holding, and
to overthrow the real holdings of other
decisions.
Today's decision will discombobulate the
whole criminal-law docket. I trust that our
superiors will have something to say about
this. Soon.
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Transcript of Sentencing Hearing in U.S. v. Fanfan
June 28, 2004
[Partial transcript of sentencing hearing held June 28, 2004. The Supreme Court consolidated
this case with U.S. v. Booker, supra. There was no published lower court opinion.]
The non lawyers in the courtroom probably
have wondered what the lawyers and I have
been talking about with recurring reference
to Blakely.
Last week on Thursday, the United States
Supreme Court handed down a decision
called Blakely v. Washington in which they,
the majority, the court, that is, basically
invalidated the state of Washington's
sentencing procedures. And ever since
Thursday morning, Judges and lawyers and
law professors and newspapers and other
commentators have been debating what it
means for sentencing generally in the United
States in a variety of state courts as well as
what it means for the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. And that's why we have
continually referred to it and what its impact
might be.
I am not going to await further briefing, it
would be I think unfair to this defendant at
this point to continue to delay his sentence.
He has been convicted now since early last
October.
I think that as the trial Judge, sentencing
Judge, my obligation is to go ahead and do
the best I can with the Supreme Court
decision. This case itself has already had at
least a couple of rounds of sentencing
briefing, and I think it would not be
appropriate to delay further. So I'm going to
go ahead and rule based upon my
understanding of what the Blakely decision
means.
According to Blakely, and I'm quoting
directly here now, "Our precedents make
clear, however, that the 'statutory
maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in
the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant."
"In other words, the relevant 'statutory
maximum' is not the maximum sentence a
judge may impose after finding additional
facts, but the maximum he may impose
without any additional findings. When a
judge inflicts punishment that the jury's
verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not
found all the facts 'which the law makes
essential to the punishment,' and the judge
exceeds his proper authority."
That's the end of the quotation, I've
admitted - I've omitted the various citations.
Moreover, the Blakely court in adhering to
the principles of its earlier Apprendi
decision states at another point, and I quote,
"Apprendi carries out this design by
ensuring that the judge's authority to
sentence derives wholly from the jury's
verdict. Without that restriction, the jury
would not exercise the control that the
Framers intended." That's the end of that
quotation.
And one other quotation near the end of the
opinion, "As Apprendi held, every
defendant has the right to insist that the
prosecutor prove to a jury all facts legally
essential to the punishment."
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So what does Blakely require me as a
sentencing Judge to do.
The dissenting Justices in Blakely, those
who disagree with the court's holding, as I
say disagreed with the holding, but they
certainly agreed with the majority on the
consequences. According to Justice
O'Connor, I'm quoting, "Under the
majority's approach," that's the court's
approach,"any fact that increases the upper
bound on a judge's sentencing discretion is
an element of the offense. Thus, facts that
historically have been taken into account by
sentencing judges to assess a sentence
within a broad range - such as drug
quantity, role in the offense, risk of bodily
harm - all must now be charged in an
indictment and submitted to a jury." End of
quote.
According to Justice Breyer, who wrote a
separate dissent, I'm quoting, "Thus, a jury
must find, not only the facts that make up
the crime of which the offender is charged,
but also all (punishment-increasing) facts
about the way in which the offender carried
out that crime." End of quote.
I conclude that without those jury findings
here, in other words, beyond the conspiracy
and the 500 grams of powder, I may not
increase the sentence above the 63 to 78
month range to the guideline range I found
earlier of 188 to 235 months.
I point out that that conclusion, although
perhaps surprising to those of us who have
been laboring under guideline sentencing for
these many years, that conclusion would not
bother the Blakely court.
I quote again from the majority opinion,
"The Framers would not have thought it too
much to demand that, before depriving a
man of three more years of his liberty, the
State should suffer the modest
inconvenience of submitting its accusation
to 'the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his
equals and neighbours,' rather than a lone
employee," that's me, the Judge, "of the
State." End of quote.
And of course, here we're talking about
much more than three years.
I have considered this matter at great length,
and I see no basis upon which to avoid the
reasoning of Blakely just because I'm
applying federal guidelines, rather than
Washington state guidelines.
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Justices Agree to Consider Sentencing
New York Times
August 3, 2004
Lyle Denniston
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
rule on the constitutionality of the guidelines
for federal criminal sentences. By acting in
its summer recess, the court signaled a sense
of urgency about resolving some of the
turmoil in the lower courts stirred up by a
decision from the Supreme Court itself.
The court set a hearing for the afternoon of
opening day of the justices' new term, Oct.
4, to review two appeals by the Justice
Department.
At the heart of the cases is the impact, if
any, on federal sentencing guidelines of a
ruling that the court issued less than six
weeks ago, in the case of Blakely v.
Washington, involving state sentencing
guidelines. In the aftermath of that ruling,
which strictly limited judges' power to
increase sentences, lower courts have issued
more than three dozen rulings, sometimes
flatly contradictory, in federal cases.
Many of those judges have ruled the
guidelines unconstitutional. A federal judge
in Boston, Nancy Gertner, said in an opinion
last week that the Blakely decision "has
effected nothing less than a sea change" in
federal criminal sentencing.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who
dissented in the 5-to-4 Blakely decision, told
a group of federal judges last month that the
decision "looks like a No.10 earthquake to
me.
The order issued by the justices on Monday
sets review on two issues: whether the June
24 decision means that the Sixth
Amendment limit on letting judges increase
sentences applies to the federal guidelines
and, if it does, whether the entire guideline
system set up by Congress in 1984 is
unconstitutional because Congress would
not have intended to create the system at all
without assigning judges that role.
The Justice Department's top advocate
before the Supreme Court, Acting Solicitor
General Paul D. Clement, raised those issues
in two appeals. Although criminal defense
lawyers urged the court to expand its review
beyond the specific questions that Mr.
Clement posed, the justices declined to do so
after Mr. Clement said that the issues he
framed would set the stage for a wide-
ranging review of the guidelines' validity.
The guidelines, created by Congress in an
effort to make sentencing in federal cases
more uniform, set up a series of punishment
ranges for specific federal crimes, and a
judge generally must follow those. But the
guidelines also empower the judge to
increase a sentence, based upon the judge's
conclusions that the crime may have been
more serious than the jury found.
One of the cases that the court will hear in
October involves Freddie J. Booker, 50, of
Racine, Wis., who was convicted of
possessing crack cocaine and distributing it.
He was sentenced to 30 years in prison by a
federal judge, even though a jury had
concluded that Mr. Booker actually
distributed a lesser amount of cocaine that
would have resulted in a lesser sentence than
the judge imposed. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
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Chicago, ruled June 30 that the Blakely
decision nullified that longer sentence, and it
ordered a new sentencing hearing.
The other case involves Ducan Fanfan, 30,
of Somerville, Mass., who was convicted in
Portland, Me., of conspiring to distribute
crack cocaine. The judge, acting after the
Supreme Court ruling in the Blakely case,
sentenced Mr. Fanfan to 6 years, instead of
the 15 to 19 years specified in the
guidelines. The justices agreed to review
that case even before the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
Boston, had a chance to rule on it.
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justices, in Bitter 5-4 Split, Raise Doubts on Sentencing Guidelines
New York Times
June 25, 2004
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court invalidated the criminal
sentencing system of the State of
Washington on Thursday in a decision that
also cast doubt on whether the 20-year-old
federal sentencing guidelines can survive a
constitutional challenge.
Bitterly split in a 5-to-4 decision that cut
across the court's usual ideological lines, the
justices continued a profound five-year-long
debate over the respective roles of judges
and juries in criminal sentencing. In this
case, they ratcheted that debate up to a new
level that left the federal guidelines in
constitutional limbo and cast doubt on the
validity of thousands of sentences, at both
the state and federal level.
Sentencing in about a dozen states is likely
to be affected by the ruling.
In a separate decision, the court rejected the
retroactive application of a 2002 death
penalty ruling, placing as many as 100
inmates in five states back on death row.
In the Washington guidelines case, Justice
Antonin Scalia's majority opinion held that
the Washington system, permitting judges to
make findings that increase a convicted
defendant's sentence beyond the ordinary
range for the crime, violated the right to trial
by jury protected by the Sixth Amendment.
The facts supporting increased sentences
must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt, Justice Scalia said.
While the federal system is considerably
more complex, it places judges in much the
same role, empowering them to make the
factual findings that determine the ultimate
sentence and requiring nothing more to
support those findings than a
"preponderance of the evidence." That is the
legal system's lowest standard of proof,
while "beyond a reasonable doubt" is its
highest.
While Justice Scalia said that "the federal
guidelines are not before us, and we express
no opinion on them," that statement
appeared to be simply marking time.
"There is nothing to suggest that the federal
guidelines would get different treatment,"
Stephanos Bibas, a former federal
prosecutor who is now a sentencing expert
at the University of Iowa law school, said in
an interview.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor depicted the federal guidelines as
being now in peril. "What I have feared
most has now come to pass," Justice
O'Connor said, referring to her own
dissenting positions in the recent precedents
that brought the court to this moment. "Over
20 years of sentencing reform are all but
lost, and tens of thousands of criminal
judgments are in jeopardy," she added.
The vote in this case, Blakely v.
Washington, No. 02-1632, was the same as
the vote in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the case
the court decided almost precisely four years
ago that began the constitutional revolution
in criminal sentencing that is now playing
out.
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As it was then, the majority on Thursday
was composed of Justices John Paul
Stevens, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in addition to
Justice Scalia. The dissenters, in addition to
Justice O'Connor, were Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony
M. Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer, the
latter an author of the federal system when
he worked for the Senate Judiciary
Committee as its chief counsel in the late
1970's. As a federal appeals court judge, he
then served on the United States Sentencing
Commission.
In the Apprendi case, the court invalidated
New Jersey's hate-crime statute, which
increased the sentence for an ordinary crime
if a judge found that the act was motivated
by bias. Other than a previous conviction,
the Supreme Court ruled then, "any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."
As Justice Scalia elaborated on Thursday,
the purpose of that rule was "to give
intelligible content to the right of jury trial,"
which he said the Constitution's framers saw
as a "circuit breaker in the state's machinery
of justice." He said the Apprendi decision
"carries out this design by ensuring that the
judge's authority to sentence derives wholly
from the jury's verdict."
In the case before the court on Thursday, a
man pleaded guilty to kidnapping his
estranged wife, a crime that under
Washington law ordinarily carries a
maximum sentence of 53 months. At
sentencing, however, the judge added an
extra 37 months, based on his finding that
the defendant, Ralph H. Blakely, Jr., had
acted with "deliberate cruelty."
Washington's statutory maximum sentence
for kidnapping is 10 years, well above what
Mr. Blakely received. But the principle of
the Apprendi decision still invalidated his
sentence, Justice Scalia said, because it
depended on a judicial rather than a jury
finding of a fact that added 70 percent to the
sentence Mr. Blakely would otherwise have
received. Mr. Blakely had a right to the
lower sentence but for the judge's
intervention, Justice Scalia said.
Juries, rather than "a lone employee of the
state," should make these decisions, Justice
Scalia said.
The decision overturned a ruling by the
Washington Supreme Court, which had
upheld the state system. While several high
courts in states with guidelines systems have
likewise rejected constitutional challenges
based on the Apprendi precedent, one court,
the Supreme Court of Kansas, struck down
its system, which the state then quickly
modified.
According to various lists, which may not be
definitive, states that use systems similar to
Washington's are Alaska, Arkansas, Florida,
Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania and Tennessee.
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor
said the court had entered "uncharted
territory." She said the guidelines systems
represented an effort to treat like cases alike,
giving "guided discretion" to judges while
eliminating wide disparities in sentencing
that turned on judicial "idiosyncrasies" or
racial bias.
"It is difficult for me to discern what
principle besides doctrinaire formalism
actually motivates today's decision," she
said.
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Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion,
said the criminal justice system was now left
with a range of unattractive options,
including such steps as separate jury trials
for sentencing, a system now reserved for
death penalty cases. As a practical matter, he
said, such a system would be workable only
because most defendants forego trials and
plead guilty.
Whether criminal defendants as a whole are
likely to be helped or hurt by the ruling is
open to debate. The National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers and the
American Civil Liberties Union filed briefs
on Mr. Blakely's behalf. But Justice Breyer
suggested that one legislative response to the
ruling might be "astronomically high
sentences," from which judges could depart
downward at their discretion,
Justice Kennedy's brief dissenting opinion
said the court had both ignored principles of
federalism and had failed to respect the need
for "the dynamic and fruitful dialogue
between the judicial and legislative branches
of government that has marked sentencing
reform on both the state and the federal
levels for more than 20 years."
The wait for a resolution of the fate of the
federal guidelines may not be long. Defense
lawyers are likely to be quick to challenge
the guidelines and federal judges, many of
whom have disliked the system, may be
receptive to the arguments. Even before the
decision, a federal district judge in
Massachusetts last week issued an
impassioned denunciation of the guidelines.
Once there is a district court decision that is
suitable for appeal, the Justice Department
might well move to bring it directly to the
Supreme Court, under a permissible but
rarely used procedure.
Any ruling will apply to all cases still on
direct appeal, but would not necessarily be
retroactive. In a death penalty case today,
the court ruled that a 2002 decision
invalidating the death penalty laws of five
states could not be applied retroactively to
death sentences that were already final when
it was issued.
The 2002 decision, Ring v. Arizona, was
itself an application of the Apprendi
decision to laws that permitted judges rather
than juries to make the finding that placed a
murder defendant in the category of those
eligible for a death sentence. In addition to
Arizona, the states were Colorado, Idaho,
Montana and Nebraska. All quickly changed
their laws to conform to Apprendi, leaving
in doubt the status of those inmates who had
previously been sentenced to death.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit then ruled that the decision
was retroactive, thus invalidating as many as
100 death sentences. But the Supreme Court
on Thursday overturned that ruling, finding
the retroactivity analysis incorrect. Justice
Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Schriro
v. Summerlin, No. 03-526. Justices Breyer,
Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg dissented.
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High Court Ruling Sows Confusion
USA Today
July 12, 2004
Joan Biskupic
In West Virginia, a man convicted of
conspiring to make methamphetamine had
his sentence cut from 20 years to one year.
In Utah, a man who took pornographic
pictures of his 9-year-old daughter had his
sentence reduced slightly, from 151 months
to 148.
And in Washington, D.C., a tractor-driving
tobacco farmer who created a scare on the
National Mall last year by threatening to set
off explosives was freed from prison more
than four years ahead of schedule.
In the two weeks since the U.S. Supreme
Court cast doubt on federal and state
sentencing guidelines by rejecting a practice
that judges have used to boost punishments
in thousands of criminal cases, judges across
the nation have begun to trim sentences and
to look to Washington for help in avoiding
what legal analysts say could be chaos in the
U.S. court system.
A few lower-court judges have ruled that the
high court's decision forces them to strike
down the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which
have been in place since 1987. "If our
decision is wrong, may the Supreme Court
speedily reverse it," U.S. Appeals Court
Judge Richard Posner wrote on Friday in a
ruling that would cut back a Wisconsin drug
defendant's time.
Congress may intervene
In a dramatic turn in the ongoing national
debate over how much discretion judges
should have in sentencing criminals, the
Supreme Court ruled June 24 that judges
cannot increase a defendant's prison time
beyond what sentencing guidelines allow -
unless a jury has found that there are
specific grounds for such an increase beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The 5-4 decision, which overturned part of a
Washington state law, also shot holes in
state and federal sentencing guidelines that
allow judges to go beyond usual sentencing
ranges in crimes that involve certain
aggravating factors. Such sentence increases
can occur in crimes that have involved a gun
or a particularly large amount of drugs, or
that have been especially cruel.
The ruling in Blakely vs. Washington is
unlikely to be applied retroactively. But
across the nation, according to estimates by
the dissenting justices, there are tens of
thousands of convicts whose appeals are in
progress, and who could try to use the ruling
to get reduced sentences.
More immediately, as seen in the case of
tractor-driving farmer Dwight Watson,
judges who were about to finalize sentences
just as the high court's ruling came down
trimmed the sentences to remove any
increases that were not supported by a jury's
findings.
Congress is weighing whether to intervene
to protect the guidelines; the Senate
Judiciary Committee will hold a hearing on
the situation Tuesday. Meanwhile,
prosecutors are scrambling to keep defense
lawyers from using the high court ruling to
win reduced sentences and more avenues for
appeals.
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Justice Department lawyers now are making
indictments more detailed, and they are
adding charges to existing criminal
complaints. The idea is to allow juries to
consider every fact in a case that could
justify a sentence longer than guidelines call
for - or to make sure defendants in plea
agreements acknowledge such facts and
waive their right to a jury for sentencing.
Partly because of the legal complexities
involved in weighing such factors, judges
usually have done such work. Before the
Supreme Court's ruling, judges also could
determine such factors by a lesser standard
of proof than "beyond a reasonable doubt,"
as the Supreme Court now requires.
With sentencing guidelines in question,
some judges have begun to fashion rules for
their own courtrooms, creating the potential
for precisely what the guidelines have long
sought to avoid: significantly different
sentences for similar crimes.
"I don't think (the reduced sentences caused
by the ruling are) so dramatically bad that
criminals are now roaming the streets," says
Ohio State University law professor Douglas
Berman, who specializes in federal
sentencing issues. "But now every judge has
the discretion to make the rules up as he or
she goes along," Berman says.
The federal sentencing guidelines are based
on the notion that sentences generally should
be uniform across the nation to avoid biases
based on a defendant's wealth, race or other
factors.
But as sentencing rules have been amended
through the years by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission and by Congress, the
guidelines have become a complicated
morass and have drawn increasing criticism.
Some judges complain that the rules
wrongly limit their discretion and give too
much authority to prosecutors, often
resulting in unnecessarily long sentences for
defendants. Some members of Congress, on
the other hand, have complained that judges
too frequently invoke exceptions to the
guidelines that allow them to give lighter
sentences. The Supreme Court's ruling
targeted practices in state and federal
guidelines-that allow judges to step outside
the guidelines to make sentences tougher.
Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin
Scalia said a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial requires that any factors
essential to a sentence lengthier than what
the guidelines prescribe must be proved to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Dissenting,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that the
majority "ignores the havoc it is about to
wreak on trial courts across the country."
Prediction coming true
Early indications are that O'Connor was
right. On Friday, when the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that
part of the federal sentencing guidelines are
invalid, it said it was acting "to provide
some guidance to district judges who are
faced with an avalanche of motions for
resentencing in light of Blakely vs.
Washington."
The facts of the Seventh Circuit case
illustrate the intersecting criminal sentencing
rules at the fore of the new debate: A jury in
western Wisconsin found Freddie Booker
guilty of possession with intent to distribute
at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, which
under the sentencing guidelines would get
him a prison sentence of 262 months, or
nearly 22 years.
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At Booker's sentencing, however, the judge
found that considerably more crack cocaine
was involved, and that Booker had
obstructed justice. Those factors led the
judge to boost Booker's sentence to 30
years.
The Chicago-based Seventh Circuit said that
under the Supreme Court's ruling, boosting
Booker's sentence was invalid because a
jury had not found the existence of the
aggravating factors that the judge used to
increase his sentence.
The previous week in Utah, U.S. District
Court Judge Paul Cassell struck down the
federal sentencing guidelines in a way that
would not allow judges to boost or decrease
sentences. Cassell, citing the Supreme
Court's ruling, trimmed the sentence for
Brent Croxford - who had been convicted
of sexual exploitation of a child - from 151
months to 148 months.
The next day, a federal judge reduced the
sentence for Watson, the North Carolina
farmer who had been convicted of making
threats and destroying government property
in Washington in March 2003. Watson was
released because he had served most of his
revised sentence of 16 months.
Some judges are tackling the problem by
assuming that federal sentencing rules are
still fully in place, but making sure
defendants know their new rights.
If the defendants contest any sentencing
increase proposed by a prosecutor, they have
a right to put the issue to a jury. If they opt
for a plea bargain - which is how the vast
majority of federal cases are resolved -
they will have to sign a waiver of their jury
rights under the Blakely ruling.
Several proposals for congressional
legislation are in the works. Some would
bring new leniency to the sentencing
guidelines; others would strengthen the hand
of prosecutors.
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Long Term in Drug Case Fuels Debate on Sentencing
New York Times
September 12, 2004
Adam Liptak
Weldon H. Angelos, a 25-year-old producer
of rap records, will be sentenced Tuesday in
federal court in Salt Lake City for selling
several hundred dollars in marijuana on each
of three occasions, his first offenses. He
faces 63 years in prison.
Laws that set mandatory minimum
sentences require 55 of the 63 years because
Mr. Angelos carried a gun while he sold the
drugs.
"It would appear effectively to be a life
sentence," the judge, Paul G. Cassell of
Federal District Court there, wrote in a
request to the prosecution and the defense
for advice about whether he has any choice
but to send the man to prison forever.
Judge Cassell, a brainy, conservative former
law professor, surveyed the maximum
sentences for other federal crimes. Hijacking
an airplane: 25 years. Terrorist bombing
intending to kill a bystander: 20 years.
Second-degree murder: 14 years.
Kidnapping: 13 years. Rape of a 10-year-
old: 11 years.
He noted that Mr. Angelos would face a far
shorter sentence in the courts of any state. In
Utah, prosecutors estimate that he would
receive five to seven years.
The Angelos case may provide a glimpse of
the future. The constitutionality of federal
sentencing guidelines was called into doubt
by a Supreme Court decision in June, but
that thinking does not extend to laws that set
mandatory minimum sentences.
If the court strikes down the guidelines this
fall, as many expect, judges will have much
greater discretion, to the dismay of many
prosecutors and politicians who worry that
judges are not tough enough on crime.
Sentencing guidelines are set by the United
States Sentencing Commission, an agency of
the judicial branch. The guidelines were
intended to limit judges' discretion without
locking them into one-size-fits-all sentences.
Mandatory minimums, in contrast, are
enacted by Congress and are part of the
criminal code.
"The guidelines always have some sort of
escape," said Jeffrey B. Sklaroff of the New
York office of Greenberg Traurig, a law
firm that represents 29 former judges and
prosecutors who filed a brief in support of
Mr. Angelos in July. "A mandatory
minimum means what it says: it is
mandatory, and it is a minimum."
In Mr. Angelos's case, the drug offenses and
related money-laundering convictions, for
using drug money to buy a car and pay his
rent, could subject him to eight years in
prison. The mandatory minimums are for the
additional offense of carrying a gun while
selling drugs. Mr. Angelos carried a Glock
pistol in an ankle holster when he sold
marijuana on two occasions, though he did
not brandish or use it. More guns were
found in a briefcase and a safe at his home.
According to the indictment, some of the
guns were stolen, though Mr. Angelos was
not accused of being the thief. Judge Cassell
is required to add five years for the gun in
the first deal and 25 years each for the
second deal and the guns found at his home.
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The Supreme Court will decide whether to
strike down the sentencing guidelines after it
hears arguments in October, and some
legislators are already signaling their
preference for more mandatory minimums if
the guidelines are deemed unconstitutional.
At a hearing in July on legislation that
would increase drug sentences,
Representative Howard Coble, Republican
of North Carolina, said, "It seems clear that
mandatory minimums may well take on
added importance in assuring appropriate
sentences for serious federal crimes as a
result of the Supreme Court's actions."
Ronald H. Weich, a former counsel to the
Senate Judiciary Committee who opposes
mandatory minimums, said they had a
political constituency. "There is a real
danger," Mr. Weich said, "that we're
heading back to mandatory minimums if
guidelines are unconstitutional."
The Justice Department supports mandatory
minimums, said Monica Goodling, a
spokeswoman.
"Tough but fair mandatory minimum
sentences take habitual lawbreakers off the
streets, lock up the most dangerous
criminals and help ensure the safety of law-
abiding Americans," Ms. Goodling said.
"Since these common-sense policies were
created, we've seen crime plummet to a 30-
year low. The public, the Congress and
presidents of both parties have supported
mandatory minimums for a simple reason --
they work."
In June, just days after the Supreme Court's
decision in Blakely v. Washington, which
struck down the sentencing system of
Washington State, Judge Cassell was the
first judge to say the logic of the decision
required the voiding of the federal
sentencing guidelines as well. In the
Angelos case, he wrote that he took "no
joy" in the "potentially cataclysmic
implications" of that reasoning.
In Blakely, the Supreme Court held that all
facts that could lead to longer sentences
must be found by a jury. But the
Washington law, like the federal guidelines,
let judges make some such findings.
"There has not been a single case in the
history of American criminal law with the
immediate impact of this one," Frank 0.
Bowman, an Indiana University expert in
sentencing law, said of Blakely. "The
United States Supreme Court has essentially
shut down the criminal justice system or at
least put it in a state of suspended
animation."
Still, whatever the Supreme Court decides
about how Blakely applies to the federal
guidelines, cases like Mr. Angelos's will not
be directly affected, for two reasons: a jury
did find the facts about the guns he
possessed, and another Supreme Court case
says judges may find the facts supporting
minimum sentences.
Mr. Angelos's lawyers and the 29 former
judges and prosecutors argue that the
mandatory sentence in his case amounts to a
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court
has not been receptive to similar arguments
in cases involving three-strikes laws and a
first-time offender given life without parole
for large-scale cocaine distribution.
However, Judge Cassell has drawn a
distinction in his academic work between
the guidelines and mandatory minimums. In
a Stanford Law Review article in April, he
wrote that "the federal sentencing
guidelines, while tough, are not 'too'
tough." But mandatory minimums, he
wrote, "can lead to possible injustices."
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In court papers, prosecutors said Mr.
Angelos "trafficked in hundreds of pounds
of high-grade marijuana," "distributed
cocaine and synthetic narcotics" and
"affiliated himself with a violent street
gang." These assertions, however, were not
proved to a jury.
Last year, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy of
the United States Supreme Court told the
American Bar Association that "in too
many cases, mandatory minimum sentences
are unwise and unjust." The association
appointed a commission, which recently
issued a report urging the abolition of such
sentencing.
"There are real economic and human
costs," said Douglas A. Berman, an Ohio
State University expert on sentencing law,
"to putting everyone away for as long as
humanly possible."
Melodie Rydalch, a spokeswoman for Paul
M. Warner, the United States attorney in
Salt Lake City, said his office had no
comment on the Angelos case. In general,
Ms. Rydalch said, "we will continue to
enforce mandatory minimums so long as
Congress tells us to."
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Justice By the Numbers
The Washington Post
October 6 and October 8, 1996
Joan Biskupic and Mary Pat Flaherty
Walk into any federal courthouse today and
the sweeping changes that have transformed
criminal justice in the United States become
evident as soon as the judge begins
sentencing a felon.
The scene may look familiar - a stern jurist
peering down from the bench at a dejected
defendant - but the language is likely to
resemble that used by U.S. District Judge
Samuel Kent in Galveston, Tex., when he
sentenced 24-year-old Martin Jarvis Jackson
for illegal firearms possession last year.
"The court finds that the base offense level
is 20," the judge began. "Pursuant to
Guideline 2K2.1(B)(4), the offense level is
increased by two levels [to 22]. [ ...J The
court notes that the criminal convictions [...]
result in a total criminal history category
score of 18. At the time of the instant
offense [...] the defendant was serving a
parole sentence in two causes of action. And
pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines
4Al.1(D), 2 points are therefore added. The
total criminal history points is 20. And
according to the sentencing guidelines
Chapter 5, Part A, 20 criminal history points
establish a criminal history category of 6.
[...] [As a result] the guideline range for
imprisonment is 84 to 105 months."
Using mathematical formulas to calculate
the just punishment for a federal crime was
supposed to ensure that Jackson and persons
convicted of the same offense would receive
roughly the same prison sentence, regardless
of the presiding judge. That was the basic
premise - and promise - behind the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, a bold overhaul of
the criminal justice system adopted by
Congress more than a decade ago.
Yet the reform has fallen far short of that
promise. A system meant to impose
uniformity is still riddled with disparity,
from region to region and even from
courtroom to courtroom. A system meant to
simplify the punishments meted out for
particular crimes has made them more
complicated, with each sentence constructed
around an arcane sequence of additions,
subtractions and point totals. A system
meant to streamline the sentencing process
instead has clogged the courts with appeals
over the nuances of an 845-page rule book
that serves as the bible of federal sentencing.
The inconsistencies in a system meant to be
uniform have triggered a furious debate
within the American legal community - one
that now engrosses front-line assistant
federal public defenders and Supreme Court
justices alike - over whether the reforms
have moved the nation closer to the ideal of
equal justice under the law. Some
prosecutors and judges defend the new
system as tough but fair, a necessary if
imperfect antidote to epidemic crime in the
United States. The sentencing guidelines, in
the phrase of one judge, bring "the certainty
of punishment" for federal crimes, which are
distinct from those enforced on a state and
local level.
But many others decry the system as fickle
and capricious, an enormously complex
creation that ultimately fails to ensure that
justice is blind to race, gender and other
factors when it comes to determining who
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goes to jail and for how long. A year-long
Washington Post investigation - including
the analysis of 79,000 criminal sentencings
and 300 court opinions - reveals that
discrepancies persist under the sentencing
reforms. Black defendants, for example, are
more likely than whites to receive the
severest sentences. And female defendants,
the analysis reveals, fare slightly better than
men when sentenced for the same crimes
under similar circumstances.
The system's severity also varies from state
to state, city to city. For example, illegal
aliens caught reentering the United States
after a previous deportation face more than
triple the jail time if tried in Los Angeles,
where the crime draws a 7-year sentence,
than they do in San Diego, where court
dockets and jail cells are so jammed that
offenders typically receive two years.
Convicted defendants who are single parents
with young children have drawn reduced
sentences in New Mexico and Washington
state, but not in Maine where that argument
was rejected.
And the sentence imposed on gun-toting
defendant Jackson in Galveston might have
been more lenient if he had been arrested in
Philadelphia, where almost half of all
federal defendants get a break on prison
terms because prosecutors there are more
willing to bargain than those elsewhere in
the country. Instead, Jackson is serving an 8-
year sentence in Texas, where prosecutors
are less likely to deal.
Among the sharpest criticisms of the system
is that federal judges, long the arbiters who
decided which punishment should fit a
particular crime, have been largely neutered
by the sentencing guidelines. Their clout has
been supplanted by newly empowered
prosecutors who can determine whether a
defendant's prison time is brief or extended
by manipulating the charges and a case's
extenuating circumstances. Judges
complain, often bitterly, that they not only
are constrained in tempering justice with
mercy but also find themselves torn between
their oath to uphold the law and a
conscientious desire to avoid blatant
injustice.
"What we have now is a Rube Goldberg-like
system," said U.S. Appeals Judge Jose
Cabranes, of New Haven, Conn., one of the
nation's most respected jurists, who
compared the guidelines to a needlessly
complicated invention. "This is not justice,
and the federal district judges in the country
know that, and no amount of pseudoscience,
no amount of technology introduced into
this process is going to alter this fact."
A Manual Like the Tax Code
Time spent in prison can be affected by
anything from a court official's math skills
to an undercover policeman's behavior:
* Paul Mitro of South Boston served a year
more in prison than he should have because
of a probation officer's math error. In
calculating the amount of Valium that Mitro
sold, the officer had to convert milligrams to
grams to kilograms and put a decimal point
in the wrong place. Mitro wound up with a
25-month sentence, instead of the 12 months
he should have been given. A fellow inmate
discovered the mistake, which had passed by
Mitro's lawyers and Judge Douglas P.
Woodlock. At his 1990 resentencing to
correct the error, Woodlock apologized, but
said, "I suppose an apology doesn't account
for much. [...] "
"The apology was bogus," Mitro said in a
recent interview. "I don't think any of them
were sincerely sorry."
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* Sharon Ortega of the District of Columbia
faced 15 years in prison after a Drug
Enforcement Administration undercover
agent convinced her to microwave powdered
cocaine to convert it to crack, doubling her
possible prison sentence.
U.S. District Judge Harold H. Greene said
her arrest demonstrated how police and
prosecutors now have the power to impose
sentences through choices made in an
investigation. That ability "to enhance a
defendant's sentence through his own
actions to an enormous degree strikes at the
very heart of our system," wrote Greene,
who gave Ortega 10 years.
* Food wholesalers David Garced and Felix
Puello were each charged in New York City
in 1992 with illegally redeeming food
stamps. But their cases ended differently
because of two judges' differing
interpretations of the guidelines.
Garced, whose fraud was estimated at $ 82
million, pleaded guilty and was put on
probation when one judge concluded that the
case did not fit the definition of loss laid out
in the sentencing manual. Puello pleaded
guilty before a different judge to a fraud
estimated at $ 40 million and was given a
21-month sentence.
To calculate prison time, judges now consult
a manual that is as intricate as the U.S. tax
code. It lays out how points will be added or
subtracted for various crimes and
circumstances surrounding those crimes.
The total is plugged into a 258-box grid,
with each box dictating a prison term.
The sentencing grid suggests science at
work, but there is nothing fixed or uniform
about how information that affects the total
makes its way into court. The process begins
when a federal probation officer prepares a
report for the judge listing factors that
should be weighed and calculating a range
of possible jail time. A defense attorney or
prosecutor may review the findings and
challenge any facts. Judges resolve any
lingering disputes.
In that mix of opinion and advocacy, science
and the appearance of mathematical
certainty often break down into the art of
legal wrangling.
The Washington Post analyzed roughly
79,000 cases sentenced under the guidelines
between Oct. 1, 1993, and Sept. 30, 1995. In
almost half, the final sentence imposed by
the court differed from the sentence
originally calculated by the probation
officer. Most of the differences were the
result of differing interpretations of the facts
of the case or of the sentencing rules.
"Whether you are hard-line law and order,
or you think the guidelines are draconian in
their punishment, you want the system to
have integrity," said William Braniff, the
former U.S. attorney for San Diego now in
private practice. "What you are doing is
important not just for those breaking the law
but for those obeying it, to reassure them
they're not suckers."
Sentencing has become such a confusing
process that lawyers and probation officers
often turn to a telephone hot line operated
out of Washington to help them sort it out.
Questions about the guidelines have become
a staple of the U.S. Supreme Court docket,
with justices issuing three rulings on the
subject last term and facing two sentencing
cases in the term that begins Monday.
Sentencing appeals have increased from 225
filed in 1988 to 8,731 in 1995, according to
the Administrative Office of the Courts.
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Some contend those changes have only
improved the federal system. Edward Dowd,
U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of
Missouri, said sterner sentences imposed
under the rules are "generally appropriate"
and an inducement for guilty pleas, saving
court time and resources by avoiding trials.
The system has virtually eliminated credit
for good behavior in jail, so the sentence
imposed is the time a defendant will actually
serve. "That's the indisputable success,"
said Dowd.
Robert S. Litt, deputy assistant attorney
general for the Justice Department's
Criminal Division, said the guidelines have
corrected the "lottery effect" that existed
when judges had control over sentencing.
But, Litt acknowledged, it is tough to prove
that there is less inconsistency. "You can't
measure it because the data doesn't exist,"
he said.
The only time the Federal Judicial Center
polled the country's 800 active and semi-
retired district judges on the system, in
1992, 86 percent of the 640 judges who
responded said the rules should be changed
to increase a judge's discretion. Slightly
more than half who responded supported
eliminating the guidelines altogether.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the majority said the
nature and severity of criminal punishment
should be left up to the judges themselves,
rather than the 845-page U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines manual that spells out the
mandated punishment for every crime
against federal law.
"These are not 'soft-headed judges,' " said
Appeals Court Judge Myron H. Bright, in
Fargo, N.D. "They serve on the front lines
of the criminal justice system and know of
what they speak. They represent appointees
of every president from Eisenhower to
Clinton."
In court opinions, in law review articles and
in interviews, judges complain that the
guidelines have transferred discretion and
authority from the court to prosecutors -
who in effect decide the sentence in advance
by deciding what the charge will be. The
law, judges argue, is an inexact system in
which justice and fairness must be balanced
on a case-by-case basis by someone with no
vested interest in the outcome. In too many
cases, they say, the guidelines-prescribed
punishment may not fit the crime - or the
criminal.
U.S. Appeals Court Judge Jose Cabranes, of
New Haven, Conn., said the guidelines
system "is a failure, a dismal failure, a fact
well known and fully understood by
virtually everyone who is associated with
the federal justice system."
Some judges disagree, saying the new
system - built on rules rather than judicial
discretion - has equalized punishment and
taken a burden off them. The rules affect the
roughly 40,000 defendants sentenced each
year under the federal system - which
operates independently of state and local
prosecutors. "On balance," said Judge
William W. Wilkins Jr. of the 4th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals and the former
U.S. Sentencing Commission chairman,
"these guidelines have produced a fairer
system by ensuring certainty of punishment
and consistency of treatment for similar
offenders convicted of like offenses."
"We had a legendary courthouse in our
circuit," said J. Harvie Wilkinson III, also a
Reagan-appointed appeals judge in the 4th
Circuit, "where one judge invariably
imposed a heavy sentence and another
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consistently refused to impose any penalty
other than probation. The greatest favor
lawyers could do their clients at sentencing
was to arrange an appearance before the
more lenient judge." A strong proponent of
the guidelines, Wilkinson said they curb
"wild, unrestrained discretion that no one
can justifiably defend."
Criticisms of the sentencing grid go to the
heart of due process and the once-prevailing
notion that justice should be based in the
trust of judges appointed for life. Judges
complain that the new system has not
achieved its main goal - eliminating
disparity - and that they constantly see
unfairness under the system.
"Human conduct just doesn't fit into a grid,"
said U.S. District Judge Judith Keep, of San
Diego.
Appeals Court Judge Harry T. Edwards, of
the District of Columbia Circuit, said
recently that he sees the guidelines as he
described them in a 1991 case: "Like the
Emperor's new clothes, the sentencing
guidelines are a bit of a farce," he said then.
"As we have come to learn, the guidelines
are rigid in formulation and, thus, often
produce harsh results that are patently unfair
because they fail to take account of
individual circumstances that might militate
in favor of a properly 'tailored' sentence."
Edwards made the comments in a case
involving a narcotics addict who was a first-
time offender and was considered a good
prospect for drug rehabilitation.
"Ironically," he said, noting that the
prosecutors effectively control the sentence
by what they charge, "[the defendant] might
have avoided the need for a downward
departure [to a lesser sentence] by playing
the guidelines game more skillfully. Had his
counsel been more cunning, the prosecutor
more amenable, or the probation officer of a
different stripe, the rules might have been
bent a little and the departure question
effectively mooted."
Judges who like the guidelines say they
appreciate clear rules of punishment
because, theoretically, defendants know
what prison time they will face and judges
are subject to less uncertainty and anxiety.
"It lowers resentments and artificial
expectations," said District Judge Samuel
Kent, in Galveston, Tex. Some defendants
believe that if neighbors send hundreds of
letters, they will get a lesser sentence. When
someone complains about a harsh sentence,
he said, "I can say, 'That's the best I can do
for you, bubba.' It is a way to insulate
myself."
Gerald B. Tjoflat, chief judge of the 11th
Circuit, said, "The system is constructed
such that [all the parties involved] go in with
their eyes wide open. The old one was just
unprincipled sentencing, really. A judge
never had to explain the sentence to anyone,
and there was widespread disparity."
Tougher punishment is what the system
overall is about and what many politicians
like most.
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin
G. Hatch (R-Utah) said the guidelines are
doing what Congress wanted: putting people
behind bars.
"We don't want to go back to the days
where the liberal judges let everyone off and
the conservative ones hung everyone,"
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Hatch said. "I've come to the conclusion
that we can't be tough enough, especially
with people who are destroying our
children's future."
Since the sentencing grid first took effect in
1987, there has never been a serious move in
Congress to eliminate the guidelines.
The nation's judges have resigned
themselves to the permanence of the
guidelines but have done so reluctantly.
"The grid lends itself to low comedy," 1st
Circuit Appeals Court Judge Bruce M.
Selya, in Providence, R.I., said in an
interview. "People think of it as a game, like
Parcheesi."
Selya, a Reagan appointee, said that overall,
"I think the sentencing commission has done
about as good a job as you can do. But
whether that sort of system really makes
sense from a social and jurisprudential point
of view is open to argument. I fall back on
the theory that if you take care in the
confirmation of judges, then I would rather
put my faith in the judges."
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Illinois v. Caballes
(03-923)
Ruling Below: (People v. Caballes, 207 Ill.2d 504, 280 Ill.Dec. 277, 802 N.E.2d 202, Illinois
Supreme Court, 2003)
A motion to suppress should have been granted where a canine sniff was performed without
specific and articulable facts to support its use, unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine
traffic stop into a drug investigation. The State had not offered sufficient justification for
implementing a canine sniff. The police did not detect the odor of marijuana in the car or note
any other evidence suggesting the presence of illegal drugs. The observations made by the
officer during the stop were insufficient to support a canine sniff. Even when these factors were
viewed together, they constituted nothing more than a vague hunch that defendant may have
been involved in possible wrongdoing.
Question Presented: Whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion
to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee
V.
ROY I. CABALLES, Appellant
Supreme Court of Illinois
Decided November 20, 2003
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
KILBRIDE, Illinois Supreme Court Justice:
Defendant, Roy I. Caballes, challenges the
procedures used by police during a routine
traffic stop. Defendant unsuccessfully
attempted to suppress evidence of marijuana
found in the trunk of his car after an alert by
a drug-detection dog and was subsequently
convicted of one count of cannabis
trafficking. The appellate court affirmed the
conviction, finding that reasonable
articulable suspicion was not needed to
conduct a canine sniff and that defendant
was unjustifiably detained by the police for
only a de minimis period of time. We
reverse and hold that the trial court should
have granted defendant's motion to suppress
based on the unjustified expansion of the
scope of the stop.
Background
On November 12, 1998, Illinois State Police
Trooper Daniel Gillette stopped defendant
on Interstate Route 80 in La Salle County
for driving 71 miles per hour in a zone with
a posted speed limit of 65 miles per hour.
Trooper Gillette radioed the police
dispatcher that he was making the traffic
stop. On hearing Gillette's radio
transmission reporting the stop, Trooper
Craig Graham of the Illinois State Police
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Drug Interdiction Team announced to the
dispatcher he was going to meet Gillette to
conduct a canine sniff. Gillette, however,
did not request Graham's assistance.
Gillette approached defendant's car,
informed him that he was speeding, and
asked for his driver's license, vehicle
registration, and proof of insurance.
Defendant complied with Gillette's requests.
Gillette testified that while at defendant's
car he noticed an atlas on the front seat, an
open ashtray, the smell of air freshener, and
two suits hanging in the back seat without
any other visible luggage. [...]
Gillette then called the police dispatcher to
ascertain the validity of defendant's license
and to check for outstanding warrants.
While waiting for the results of the license
check, Gillette asked defendant where he
was going and why he was "dressed up."
Defendant replied that he was moving from
Las Vegas to Chicago. He was accustomed
to being dressed up because he was a
salesman, although he was not currently
employed. Gillette testified that defendant
continued to act nervous even after being
told he was receiving only a warning ticket.
Gillette considered defendant's continued
nervousness unusual.
Dispatch informed Gillette that defendant
had surrendered a valid Illinois license to
Nevada, but the validity of his Nevada
license was not confirmed for two more
minutes. After receiving that confirmation,
Gillette requested defendant's criminal
history. He then asked defendant for
permission to search his vehicle, and
defendant refused to give consent.
Gillette next asked defendant if he had ever
been arrested, and defendant responded that
he had not. The dispatcher subsequently
reported that defendant had two prior arrests
for distribution of marijuana, and Gillette
began to write the warning ticket. He was
interrupted by another officer calling him
over the radio on an unrelated matter.
Gillette testified he was still writing the
warning ticket when Trooper Graham
arrived with his drug-detection dog and
began walking around defendant's car. The
dog alerted at defendant's trunk in less than
a minute. After Graham advised him of the
alert, Gillette searched defendant's trunk and
found marijuana.
Defendant was then arrested and taken to the
police station, where he signed the warning
ticket. He was subsequently charged with
one count of cannabis trafficking.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the
drugs found in the trunk and to quash the
arrest. The trial court denied the motion and
found defendant guilty after a bench trial.
Defendant was sentenced to 12 years in
prison and ordered to pay a street value fine
of $256,136.
Defendant appealed, and the appellate court
affirmed, finding that the police did not need
reasonable articulable suspicion to justify
the canine sniff and that, although the
criminal history check improperly extended
defendant's detention, the delay was de
minimis. This court granted defendant's
petition for leave to appeal.
Analysis
On appeal, defendant challenges the denial
of his motion to suppress the evidence
uncovered by the canine sniff. This court
recently decided a similar issue in People v.
Cox. In that case, we applied the two-part
test adopted in Terry v. Ohio to determine
the overall reasonableness of the stop.
Although a traffic stop was not at issue in
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Terry, this court has previously applied the
principles of that case to routine traffic
stops. Accordingly, we will also apply the
Terry test in this case. We must consider:
"(1) *whether the officer's action was
justified at its inception' and (2) 'whether it
was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.' " Here, it is
undisputed that the traffic stop was properly
initiated. Thus, we need only examine the
second part of the Terry test, concerning the
reasonableness of the officer's conduct. The
State bears the burden of establishing that
the conduct remained within the scope of the
stop.
In Cox, we concluded that evidence obtained
by a canine sniff was properly suppressed
because calling in a canine unit unjustifiably
broadened the scope of an otherwise routine
traffic stop into a drug investigation. We
emphasized that the sniff was impermissible
without " specific and articulable facts" to
support the stopping officer's request for the
canine unit.
Here, as in Cox, the State has not offered
sufficient justification for implementing a
canine sniff. The police did not detect the
odor of marijuana in the car or note any
other evidence suggesting the presence of
illegal drugs. Although Officer Gillette did
not actively summon Trooper Graham and
his dog for the purpose of conducting a
canine sniff, as occurred in Cox, the overall
effect remains the same. As in Cox, the
police impermissibly broadened the scope of
the traffic stop in this case into a drug
investigation because there were no specific
and articulable facts to support the use of a
canine sniff.
Moreover, the observations made by Officer
Gillette during the stop that (1) defendant
said he was moving to Chicago, but the only
visible belongings were two sport coats in
the backseat of the car, (2) the car smelled of
air freshener, (3) defendant was dressed for
business while traveling cross-country, even
though he was unemployed, and (4)
defendant seemed nervous were insufficient
to support a canine sniff. The lack of visible
luggage in the interior of the car may be
readily explained, since any personal items
being transported could have been stored in
the trunk or shipped separately. While air
fresheners may be used to mask the odor of
contraband, air fresheners are also used in
cars to mask other odors such as cigarette
smoke. As for defendant's choice of travel
attire, we fail to see how his stated
preference for business clothing suggests
any involvement in past or present criminal
activity. Also, the general allegation that
defendant appeared nervous, without more,
cannot serve as a reasonable basis for further
detaining defendant.
Finally, even when these factors are viewed
together, they constitute nothing more than a
vague hunch that defendant may have been
involved in possible wrongdoing. [...I [W]e
hold that the trial court should have granted
defendant's motion to suppress based on the
unjustified expansion of the scope of the
stop.
Conclusion
Here, as in Cox, a canine sniff was
performed without "specific and articulable
facts" to support its use, unjustifiably
enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop
into a drug investigation. Under these
circumstances, the trial court should have
granted defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence obtained after the police dog's
alert. The judgments of the appellate court
and the trial court are reversed.
Judgments reversed.
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DISSENT; THOMAS, Illinois Supreme
Court Justice:
With today's decision, the dicta in People v.
Cox becomes the law. Because I strongly
disagreed with the Cox dicta, I dissent from
the majority opinion.
In Cox, this court upheld a suppression order
on the basis that the defendant had suffered
an illegal detention. After so concluding, the
court tacked on a gratuitous section that
concluded that the police may not conduct a
canine sniff of a vehicle unless they have a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
car's occupants are possessing a controlled
substance. According to the Cox majority,
Terry principles govern whether the police
may conduct a canine sniff of a lawfully
detained vehicle.
Typically, having once voiced disagreement
with an opinion, a justice will follow the
opinion in future cases because of stare
decisis considerations. I cannot do that with
Cox because that case is wholly
incompatible with United States Supreme
Court cases construing the fourth
amendment. This court is obligated to
follow decisions of the United States
Supreme Court on questions of federal
constitutional law, and I cannot join an
opinion that fails to do so.
As I explained in Cox, under the Supreme
Court cases, a canine sniff is not a search. In
Cox, the majority refused to acknowledge
that a canine sniff is not a search and failed
to discuss City of Indianapolis or Place. If a
sniff is not a search, then the police do not
need probable cause to conduct one. Further,
allowing a canine to sniff a vehicle that is
already detained does not transform the
seizure into a fourth amendment search. The
Supreme Court made this plain in City of
Indianapolis:
"It is well established that a
vehicle stop at a highway
checkpoint effectuates a seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. [Citation.] The fact
that officers walk a narcotics-
detection dog around the exterior
of each car at the Indianapolis
checkpoints does not transform
the seizure into a search.
[Citation.] Just as in Place, an
exterior sniff of an automobile
does not require entry into the car
and is not designed to disclose
any information other than the
presence or absence of narcotics.
[Citation.] Like the dog sniff in
Place, a sniff by a dog that
simply walks around a car is
'much less intrusive than a
typical search.' [Citation.]"
After ignoring the cases holding that canine
sniffs are not searches, the Cox majority
held that sniffs were controlled by Terry
principles, even though the Supreme Court
has made it clear that Terry applies only to
searches for weapons. It has never been
extended to general searches for
incriminating evidence. As I explained in
Cox:
"I also disagree with the appellate court's
holding (and the majority's apparent implied
holding) that canine sniffs should be
considered limited investigatory stops
governed by Terry v. Ohio. Terry allows the
police to briefly detain an individual when
the officer 'observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of
his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot.' Additionally, the officer is allowed,
without a warrant, to conduct a careful
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limited search of the person when his
observations reasonably lead him to believe
that the person might be carrying a weapon.
The purpose of the 'frisk' is to allow the
police, for their own safety and the safety of
others, to determine if the person is armed.
The Court reached its decision by balancing
the need to search against the invasion the
search entails. As Professor LaFave has
noted, however, 'there is no search-for-
evidence counterpart to the Terry weapons
search, permissible on only a reasonable
suspicion that such evidence would be
found.' [...]
Thus, the majority's apparent belief that a
canine sniff for narcotics is a search that can
be conducted on an officer's mere
reasonable suspicion impermissibly extends
Terry to general searches for evidence."
The majority's opinion is wholly invalid on
this ground because the Supreme Court
requires probable cause for warrantless
searches of vehicles. If a sniff is a search,
then the police cannot conduct one in the
absence of probable cause. Thus, in trying to
restrict the authority of the police in a
routine traffic stop, the majority has
unwittingly restricted a defendant's fourth
amendment rights by applying Terry to what
the majority believes to be a search for
incriminating evidence.
In another passage that bears repeating, I
pointed out the majority's dilemma:
"In sum, the answer to the question of
whether a canine sniff is a search leads to
two possible outcomes. If a sniff is a search,
then the police need probable cause to
conduct one. If a sniff is not a search, then
neither the fourth amendment nor article 1, §
6, of the Illinois Constitution is implicated.
There simply cannot be a 'reasonable
suspicion' middle ground because the
United States Supreme Court has not
expanded Terry to general searches for
incriminating evidence, as opposed to
searches for weapons.
The majority thus refuses to answer the
threshold question, because an answer
cannot lead to its result. Instead, the
majority has issued a policy decision with
no foundation in the law."
In the case before us, the majority has not
held that defendant's vehicle was subjected
to an illegal detention. Therefore, because
the police did not impermissibly extend the
traffic stop to allow the canine to sniff
defendant's car, defendant's fourth
amendment rights were not violated. The
canine sniff was not a search, and thus the
police did not need probable cause or a
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing before
conducting it.
As with Cox, this decision is wholly
incompatible with United States Supreme
Court case law construing the fourth
amendment and is subject to reversal by that
court. Accordingly, I cannot join in this
opinion, or in any other one that follows and
applies the Cox rule.
JUSTICES FITZGERALD and GARMAN
join in this dissent.
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High Court Takes Police-dog Case
USA Today.
April 06, 2004
Joan Biskupic
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to
decide whether the use of drug-sniffing dogs
by police during routine traffic stops violates
motorists' privacy rights. The question the
justices will consider this fall in an Illinois
case is whether officers who make a routine
traffic stop may walk a drug-sniffing dog
around the car, even though the officers
have no grounds to suspect any wrongdoing
beyond the traffic violation.
The case boils down to whether the sniffing
of a dog amounts to a 'search' that falls
under the Fourth Amendment and its
requirement that officers have a reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing before conducting
a search. Illinois officials, and police
organizations backing them, say the actions
of drug-sniffing dogs are 'uniquely
unobtrusive' and can be likened to those of
officers who merely inspect a car's exterior.
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled last year
that using a police dog in a traffic stop when
there is no reason to suspect illegal activity
improperly expands the scope of a traffic
stop and is unconstitutional. Other courts
have ruled the opposite. In past cases, the
U.S. Supreme Court has said the sniff of a
dog is far less intrusive than a typical police
search. But it has never resolved the issue
presented by the Illinois case. Two groups of
police chiefs have told the U.S. Supreme
Court that the Illinois court's ruling
'threatens to undermine the government's
war on terror, which relies on canines to
sniff vehicles and luggage for narcotics and
explosives at large gatherings or at [...]
airports.' But the Illinois case involves only
searches of vehicles, not of people or
belongings in airports, train stations or other
public buildings where police have more
latitude to conduct searches. The Illinois
case began in November 1998, when an
Illinois trooper stopped Roy Caballes for
going 71 mph in a 65 mph zone on Interstate
80 in LaSalle County. Another trooper heard
a radio call about the stop and went to the
scene with a dog.
The first trooper asked Caballes if he could
search the car; Caballes said no. While the
first trooper was writing a warning ticket,
the other trooper led the dog around
Caballes' car. The dog indicated drugs
might be in the trunk. The troopers found
marijuana that court papers said had a street
value of $256,136. Caballes eventually was
convicted of drug trafficking, sentenced to
12 years in prison and fined $256,136.
Caballes challenged his conviction, claiming
that the drug evidence should not have been
used against him because the troopers used
the dog to do an illegal search. The Illinois
Supreme Court agreed and said the officers
'had nothing more than a vague hunch'
about possible wrongdoing when the dog
was used. Caballes' attorney, Ralph
Meczyk, said Monday that the use of a dog
can be more intrusive than it appears
because it typically prolongs a police stop.
He also said there are no safeguards to
ensure that police do not manipulate dogs to
indicate the presence of drugs so that police
can conduct more detailed searches. In
Illinois' appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court,
state Solicitor General Gary Feinerman
relied on two high court cases that
distinguished dog sniffs from police actions.
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He called a dog search a 'non-event' under
the Fourth Amendment. 'Because a canine
sniff does not expose items that would
otherwise remain hidden,' he wrote,
'information is obtained without the
intrusion or discomfiture associated with a
traditional search.'
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Supreme Court to Hear La Salle County Drug Case
The News Tribune (LaSalle, Illinois)
Tuesday, April 06, 2004
Tom Collins and The Associated Press
A precedent-making drug case that
originated in La Salle County is headed for
the Supreme Court of the United States.
The case against Roy Caballes began in
1998 when state police seized nearly 300
pounds of marijuana during a Peru traffic
stop, and took an unexpected turn in
November when the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled that police weren't justified in using a
drug-sniffing dog at the scene.
That decision overturned Caballes' 12-year
sentence and abruptly restricted the use of
drug-sniffing dogs, much to the surprise and
dismay of prosecutors.
The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed the
use of drug dogs and there's a long history
of this not being considered a search, said
La Salle County State's Attorney Joe Hettel.
The dog is merely sniffing the air which is
outside of a compartment or car, and the
courts have drawn the line right there.
Now, the nation's highest court has agreed
to use the Caballes case to clarify when
police can use drug-sniffing dogs to check
stopped cars when police have little reason
to suspect illegal activity.
Caballes was stopped for speeding Nov. 12,
1998, on Interstate 80. Trooper Dan Gillette
became suspicious of Caballes' nervous
behavior and of his improbable story and
asked Caballes for consent to search the
vehicle. Caballes refused, but while Gillette
was writing a speeding ticket, trooper Craig
Graham arrived on his own and not at
Gillette's request with a drug-sniffing dog
that alerted to the trunk area. Police
recovered 282 pounds of pot.
Caballes was convicted in La Salle County
Circuit Court and later sentenced to 12
years, but was allowed to post bond pending
the outcome of his appeal.
In November, the state Supreme Court ruled
4-3 in Caballes' favor, saying that Gillette's
suspicions amounted to little more than a
hunch that Caballes might be up to no good,
and that his hunch was not sufficient
grounds for a canine sniff.
Lawyers across the country will watch this
case closely, and Hettel is especially
interested. Though Illinois' solicitor general
will handle the case in Washington, Hettel
said he plans to inquire about assisting with
the case in some capacity.
I would certainly like to be there for the oral
arguments, he said, as this has tremendously
impacted our county.
Indeed, La Salle County prosecutors
watched helplessly last week as an unrelated
drug case unraveled as a direct result of the
Caballes ruling.
The decision also threatens the drug fund,
which draws funds from the seizure of drugs
and contraband.
Hettel's office relies on the already-
shrinking drug fund revenues fell by half
between 1998 and 2003 for many resources
and Caballes would further inhibit that
source of funding.
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The case could also have sweeping
implications for motorists and defendants,
according to Ralph Meczyk, one of Caballes
lawyers.
Police often look for a way to turn a traffic
stop into an all-out search, Meczyk said, and
drug dogs can be a convenient pretext. In
Illinois, he said, eight of nine traffic stops
where a dog indicates drugs or other
contraband turn up nothing.
But the Illinois attorney general and law
enforcement groups argued that drug dogs
are highly effective, work quickly and pose
little or no inconvenience for drivers.
When properly trained, the dogs' heightened
sense of smell allows them to detect
specified narcotics without entering or
rummaging through the vehicle, the Illinois
Association of Chiefs of Police and the
national Major Cities Chiefs Association
told the court.
Limiting police ability to use drug dogs
could harm anti-drug efforts at airports and
borders as well as on the streets and could
affect the hunt for other contraband or for
terrorists, the police chiefs said.
The court previously has allowed police
considerable leeway to stop and search cars
but also has refused to allow random
roadblocks to look for drugs.
The court ruled four years ago that police
were out of bounds when they used drug
dogs to check out cars at roadblocks set up
in a high-crime Indianapolis neighborhood,
because they lacked any special reason to
suspect any individual car or driver.
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An Officer's Best Buddy
Medill News Service
June 2004
Adriana Mateus
On a typical afternoon outing, Sgt. Todd
Trautvetter and his buddy Rakker can often
be found riding through Springfield, Ill.
enjoying each other's company.
The friends are also business partners.
"He's a very good judge of character," is a
phrase often used by Trautvetter when
referring to his pal of many years.
Indeed, Rakker, among many other traits,
can easily pick up on his friend's mood
changes. He is also playful, such as when he
leans over from the passenger seat and licks
Trautvetter in the face. He then quickly
jumps to the back of the truck where he
can't be reached.
Rakker, a detection dog of the Illinois State
Police Canine Unit, and his handler Sgt.
Trautvetter, the unit supervisor, have
worked together for nearly 10 years.
The two are among 38 such Illinois teams
working to reduce the flow of illegal
narcotics.
Yet fighting the war on drugs is not the only
job canines like Rakker perform.
Since Sept. 11, 2001, canine units in law
enforcement agencies throughout the
country have expanded their focus to include
terrorism-related work, particularly in
airport security.
Detector dogs first began to be used in the
United States in 1970 as part of the U.S.
Customs Service's efforts to interdict
narcotics being smuggled into the country
through major air, sea and land border ports.
At first, the experimental narcotics detector
program trained dogs to detect and respond
to marijuana and hashish, soon adding other
substances such as heroine, [ecstacy and
methamphetamine].
Charged with protecting the nation's
borders, the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Agency, under the Department of
Homeland Security, came together in March
2003 through the combination of U.S.
Customs Service, U.S. Border Patrol,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, as
well as areas of the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture.
According to CBP, canine enforcement
teams can be utilized to search for a trained
odor in almost any area.
The agency houses the Canine Enforcement
Program, which trains and deploys canine
teams in various capacities, including the
detection of narcotics, currency, explosives,
chemicals, agriculture, and humans.
Following Sept. 11, demand for detection
dogs has risen and their roles have expanded
to include wider and larger potential threats
ranging from explosives to concealed
terrorists.
301
Human detector dogs are used to detect
concealed persons attempting to enter the
United States illegally.
Pre-9/11, the dogs had been trained to track
human scents such as that of a burglar
attempting to escape from a police officer or
finding victims and survivors of human and
other catastrophes. Post-9/1 1, with a greater
risk for terrorism-related activities, training
for detection of concealed humans, such as
individuals hiding in the trunk of a car or a
terrorist flying into the country, have
become much more prevalent,
CEP teams have been law enforcement
training canine departments throughout the
country for a number of years, according to
Titus. Yet, there are differences between the
level of authority and other requirements
federal and local teams must follow.
When deploying a team for a search of
almost any kind, CEP need not concern
itself with obtaining a search warrant; local
and state law enforcement, on the other
hand, often will. For example, in People v.
Cox, a case concerning the suppression of
evidence obtained during a canine sniff, the
finding of "specific and articulable facts,"
often needs to be adhered to.
Canines can come from a variety of breeds.
Labrador retrievers, Golden retrievers,
Belgian Malinois, German Shepherds, Dutch
Shepherds, English Beagle, and mixed
breeds are all included in canine teams
throughout the country and world.
Hence breed is not the most important factor
in selection. Instead, personality plays a
large role in determining which canine
might find a great career in detection.
"We usually take the dogs nobody else
wants," said Trautvetter. "Being a -spas' is
usually a good indication that a dog might
make a good sniffing dog."
However, for other dogs destined to spend a
majority of their time dealing with the
public and not only with their handler, a less
aggressive personality is imperative.
"We look for happy-go-lucky types," Titus
said, adding that a high work ethic is still
very important.
As for Rakker, drive and enthusiasm are two
key traits his handler said have led to a
successful nine-and-a-half year career.
Indicative of his name and heritage, Rakker,
the 'crazy one' in Dutch, remains a crazy
spas, according to Trautvetter.
While many of the dogs are obtained from
animal shelters, humane societies and rescue
leagues in the U.S., many others are
imported from European countries,
including Holland, France, Germany and
Czechoslovakia.
The U.S. began a breeding program in 1998,
which now provides an additional source for
the high-demand detector dogs.
European dogs, which have not been very
common in the U.S., are quite popular in
Europe. The Belgian Malinois is one of
them.
"It's considered to be hyperactive,"
Trautvetter said, noting also cultural
differences. Breeding standards and their
integration into the overall culture is simply
different, he adds. In the U.S., dogs are seen
as pets whereas in Europe they are widely
accepted as a part of the community and can
often be seen traveling everywhere with
their owners.
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Canines are evaluated one or more times a
year with performance an intricate part of
their continued employment.
The amount of time one canine remains on
the job varies. At CEP, they are retired after
nine years. Other teams keep them longer as
long as they're physically able.
The use of canine detector dogs has led to
more than 13,726 narcotic seizures or in
excess of 1.3 million pounds of narcotics by
CEP in 2003.
In addition, more than 32,000 concealed
humans have been uncovered.
But the advantages to using CDDs do not
end with statistics. Dogs can check packages
in a fraction of the time it takes a human
inspector. A canine can examine a vehicle in
five to six minutes, whereas an inspector
would take at least 20.
"They are performing community service,"
said Trautvetter, who noted that being
accompanied by Rakker often serves as an
icebreaker between law enforcement and the
general public.
Rakker spends time both during the week
and weekend with his dog handler. As such,
he is a part of the family. "The first thing my
kids ask about him is how he performed."
For Trautvetter, having Rakker look flawless
and amazing is one of the most gratifying
aspects of his job.
Yet while for law enforcement, odor
recognition is a key aspect of performance,
for Rakker and other sniffing dogs, work is
more like a game. "It's playing hide-and-
seek to them," said Trautvetter.
The canines are also their handlers' best
protection in perilous situations.
At the end of the day, Rakker's attitude,
according to Trautvetter, might best be
reflected as follows: "I may be a dog, yet
I'm still the intelligent one."
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Jama v. INS
(03-674)
Ruling Below: (Jama v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 329 F. 3d 630, 8th Cir. 2003)
The court of appeals held that the INS had the statutory authority, under 8 USC § 1231(b)(2)(E),
to remove an alien to a country without first receiving that country's acceptance of the alien. The
lower court granted Jama a writ of habeas corpus to prevent the execution of the removal orders.
The court held that a careful reading of the statutory language shows that the INS is allowed to
deport Jama without consent from his birth country. The court of appeals reversed the lower
court's findings.
Question Presented: Whether the INS may remove a lawful permanent resident to a country
designated in 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(2)(E) where that country lacks a functioning government and is
unable to render an acceptance of the alien?
Keyse G. JAMA, Appellee
V.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Appellant
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Decided May 27, 2003
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
MORRIS, Circuit Judge:
More than three years after he entered the
United States, Somalian refugee Keyse Jama
pleaded guilty to third degree assault in
Minnesota state court. As a result of this
felony conviction, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) initiated
removal proceedings against Mr. Jama as an
alien who had been convicted of "a crime
involving moral turpitude." Mr. Jama
conceded his removability, and the
immigration judge rejected his applications
for humanitarian relief. The Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the
immigration judge's decision. After the INS
issued a warrant of removal to Mr. Jama, he
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to
prevent the execution of his removal order.
In that petition, Mr. Jama argued that under
8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(2), the INS could not
remove him to Somalia without first
establishing that Somalia would accept his
return.
On March 1, 2003, after the parties argued
this case but before this opinion was filed,
the INS ceased to exist as an independent
agency within the United States Department
of Justice, and its functions were transferred
to the newly formed Department of
Homeland Security. For ease of reference
and because of the status of the agency at
the time this case was submitted, this
opinion will refer to the agency as the INS.
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The district court granted habeas relief in
favor of Mr. Jama, and the INS appeals that
decision. We believe that the district court
correctly concluded that it had jurisdiction to
consider Mr. Jama's habeas petition, but we
reverse the district court's order granting the
wit.
L
The INS seeks review of the district court's
conclusion that it had jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. 2241 to consider Mr. Jama's habeas
petition. Relying on general principles of
procedural default and waiver, the INS first
argues that Mr. Jama should have
challenged the INS's decision to remove
him to Somalia by bringing a timely petition
for review in this court following the
administrative proceedings that resulted in
his final order of removal to Somalia.
But as both parties recognize, Congress has
directed that "no court shall have
jurisdiction to review any final order of
removal against an alien who is removable
by reason of having committed" a crime of
moral turpitude. Although it is true that we
retain "direct review" jurisdiction to
determine whether an alien's criminal
conviction is indeed the type of offense that
subjects him to removal, as well as to
consider substantial constitutional
challenges to the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), neither of these
exceptions applies in Mr. Jama's case. Mr.
Jama has long since conceded that his
criminal conviction renders him removable.
Mr. Jama does not, as the INS suggests,
raise a substantial constitutional challenge to
the INA.
Mr. Jama's challenge is one of statutory
construction, notwithstanding his fleeting
(and we think unavailing) references to the
procedural and substantive due process
implications of removing him to a country
that has not agreed to accept him. The INS
also contends that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over Mr. Jama's habeas petition
because it constitutes a challenge to the
execution of a removal order prohibited by 8
U.S.C. 1252(g).
That statute provides in relevant part that
"no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or. on behalf of any alien
arising from the decision or action by the
Attorney General to [ ...] execute removal
orders." Mr. Jama, however, is not objecting
to an unfavorable discretionary decision or
action to execute the removal order. He
challenges, rather, the Attorney General's
construction of a statute; specifically, the
Attorney General's legal conclusion that 8
U.S.C. 1231(b)(2)(E)(iv) authorizes the INS
to remove Mr. Jama to Somalia without first
establishing that Somalia will accept his
return. Our role here (and the role of the
district court below) is not to second-guess
the Attorney General's exercise of his
discretion; it is to address a purely legal
question of statutory construction. We
believe, therefore, that Mr. Jama's question
is simply outside the scope of the
jurisdiction-stripping provision of 1252(g).
We note, moreover, that permitting Mr.
Jama to proceed with his habeas petition is
entirely consistent with the principles set
forth in INS v. St. Cyr, Calcano-Martinez v.
INS, and Demore.
Although those cases did not address
1252(g), we believe that they are pertinent to
the jurisdictional issue at hand. Absent a
"clear, unambiguous, and express statement
of congressional intent" to the contrary, we
have no reason to assume that Congress
intended to preclude the district court's
habeas review of a pure question of law such
as the one presented by Mr. Jama. We note
further that construing 1252(g) to eliminate
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"review of a pure question of law by any
court would give rise to substantial
constitutional questions."
II. Analysis of 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(2)
The INS also asserts that the district court
misconstrued 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(2) when it
concluded that that statute requires the INS
to establish that Somalia will accept Mr.
Jama's return prior to removing him to that
country. We agree. Before we turn to the
merits of the INS's argument, we review
briefly the statute at issue here. Section
1231(b)(2) sets forth a progressive, three-
step process for determining a removable
alien's destination country. The statute first
permits the alien to select a country of
removal, subject to certain limitations if the
country designated is one that is contiguous
or adjacent to the United States. 8 U.S.C.
1231(b)(2)(A)-(B). The Attorney General
may disregard the alien's designation under
four specified circumstances; for example, if
the designated country is unwilling to accept
the alien.
In the second step, assuming the alien has
failed to select a country or cannot be
removed to his designated country under
step one, the Attorney General is directed to
"remove the alien to a country of which the
alien is a subject, national, or citizen" unless
the country is unwilling to accept the alien
or fails to indicate (upon an inquiry by the
Attorney General) that it will accept the
alien. 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(2)(D). If the alien is
not removed to a country where he is a
subject, national, or citizen, then the
Attorney General must proceed to the third
step of the process.
That step entails selecting a destination
country from a list of statutory "[a]dditional
removal countries", as follows: (i) The
country from which the alien was admitted
to the United States. (ii) The country in
which is located the foreign port from which
the alien left for the United States or for a
foreign territory contiguous to the United
States. (iii) A country in which the alien
resided before the alien entered the country
from which the alien entered the United
States. (iv) The country in which the alien
was born. (v) The country that had
sovereignty over the alien's birthplace when
the alien was born. (vi) The country in
which the alien's birthplace is located when
the alien is ordered removed. (vii) If
impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible to
remove the alien to each country described
in a previous clause of this subparagraph,
another country whose government will
accept the alien into that country.
In this case, the parties agree that Mr.
Jama's removal destination must be
determined at the third step of the process,
and it is to this step that we now turn. The
INS seeks to remove Mr. Jama to Somalia
because it is "[t]he country in which [Mr.
Jamal was born." The parties disagree,
however, on whether the statute requires the
INS to establish that Somalia will accept Mr.
Jama's return prior to effecting his removal.
This disagreement is significant; if prior
acceptance is required, the INS will be
unable to return Mr. Jama to Somalia. This
is because Somalia lacks a functioning
central government, rendering it impossible
for the INS to obtain Somalia's prior
acceptance. Mr. Jama cites United States ex
rel. Tom Man v. Murff and its unquestioning
progeny for the proposition that the
acceptance requirement of clause (vii)
applies to clauses (i) through (vi). We are
not bound by these decisions; indeed, we are
not persuaded by them because they
disregard the plain language of the statute
itself, which is the "starting point in any
question of statutory interpretation." Our
careful review of the statute reveals that, as
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matter of simple statutory syntax and
geometry, the acceptance requirement is
confined to clause (vii), and does not apply
to clauses (i) through (vi). This statute well
illustrates the maxim "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius," or "expression of the one
is the exclusion of the other." Congress
inserted an acceptance requirement into
steps one and two, and into the self-
contained provision that appears in clause
(vii) of step three. Congress did not insert an
acceptance requirement into the self-
contained provisions that appear in clauses
(i) through (vi). "Courts are obligated to
refrain from embellishing statutes by
inserting language that Congress has opted
to omit." In other words, we believe that the
"short answer" to Mr. Jama's assertion (that
the INS must obtain prior acceptance before
returning him to the country of his birth) is
that "Congress did not write the statute that
way."
Whether it is politically wise, efficient, or
considerate of the United States to remove
an alien without the prior acceptance of the
alien's destination country is, quite simply, a
question that lies outside our province.
Mr. Jama contends that this interpretation of
step three nullifies the preceding provisions
of the statute. We disagree. We reject, for
example, Mr. Jama's suggestion that our
plain reading of the statute, which permits
the INS to return an alien to his country of
birth without prior acceptance, wholly
eviscerates the need to obtain a destination
country's acceptance before returning its
"subject, national or citizen."
An alien is not always a subject, national or
citizen of the country in which he was born.
We note, moreover, that between countries,
it is not uncommon behavior to attempt to
accomplish a task by asking politely first,
and then to act anyway if the request is
refused. We also reject Mr. Jama's
suggestion that, in the absence of any
material difference between 1231(b)(2) and
its predecessor statute, 8 U.S.C. 1253(a)
(1994), this court must presume that
Congress meant to incorporate and adopt the
(as Mr. Jama sees it) "settled judicial
construction" that reads the prior acceptance
requirement into all clauses of the statute.
Whether or not this presumption applies
only to decisions by the United States
Supreme Court or includes all judicial and
administrative constructions of the statute is
immaterial. Under either standard, there
exists no settled judicial construction of the
provision in question.
The dissenting opinion takes the view that
Niesel addresses only the issue of an initial
inquiry into whether a country will accept an
alien, and thus does not bear on a country's
final agreement to accept an alien. Our
reading of Niesel, however, convinces us
that no such distinction exists in that case or
under the statute. Niesel recognizes that
certain portions of the statute (steps one and
two, and clause (vii) of step three) require
the INS's "preliminary inquiry" as to
whether a country is willing to accept an
alien prior to ordering the alien deported to
that country, and that under the remaining
portions of the statute, no such preliminary
inquiry is required.
It does not follow from this that there exists
some sort of statutorily-required "final
inquiry" that applies to the deportation of
every alien under every portion of the
statute. We note, moreover, that contrary to
what the dissenting opinion suggests, the
BIA did not abandon Niesel 's holding in In
re Linnas. That case arose in New York, and
the BIA, citing Tom Man, noted that "the
language of [the statute] expressly requires,
or has been construed to require, that the
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'government' of a country selected under
any of the three steps must indicate it is
willing to accept a deported alien into its
'territory."' Finally, we note the dissenting
opinion's reluctance to apply the words of
the statute because to do so would not
"accord with [the dissenting judge's] sense
of liberty and justice."
III. Conclusion
Having reviewed Mr. Jama's remaining
arguments, we conclude that they are
without merit. Accordingly, for the reasons
stated, we reverse the district court's order
granting the writ, and remand the case to the
district court for the entry of an order
denying Mr. Jama's habeas petition under
28 U.S.C. 2241.
DISSENT; BYE, Circuit Judge:
I agree the district court and this court have
jurisdiction to consider Mr. Jama's habeas
petition. I disagree, however, that 8 U.S.C.
1231(b)(2) allows our government to
remove Mr. Jama to Somalia before a
functioning central government has
indicated it will accept him. Because I
would affirm the district court's order
granting the writ, I respectfully dissent. For
nearly a half century, the courts have held
the United States cannot deport an alien
unless the receiving country advises us it is
willing to accept the alien.
Forty-four years ago, Judge Learned Hand
interpreted the statutory provisions at issue
here and concluded there were no
circumstances under which the statute
allowed the United States to deport an alien
unless the receiving country was "willing to
accept" him. Judge Hand's interpretation of
the statute subsequently became well-
settled. The long-standing policy and, until
recently, practice of the INS have been
consistent with Judge Hand's interpretation.
Each time Congress amended the INA or re-
enacted the statutory provisions which now
appear at 1231(b)(2) without making any
material changes to the precursor statute, it
adopted the well-settled construction given
the precursor by the courts and the INS.
The majority cites In re Niesel, for the
proposition there was no settled judicial
construction of the disputed provisions. I
disagree. "Niesel simply held that the
government appropriately disregarded a
petitioner's designation and lawfully chose
another country without first inquiring
whether that country would accept the
petitioner. Thus, Matter of Niesel addressed
only the issue of an initial inquiry, not final
acceptance of the country to which a person
would be returned." Even if Niesel had held
no final acceptance was required, the Board
of Immigration Appeals clearly abandoned
that position in Linnas. We are not to
interpret statutory text in a manner which
leads to absurd results.
The majority explains its interpretation of
the statute in part by noting "between
countries, it is not uncommon behavior to
attempt to accomplish a task by asking
politely first, and then to act anyway if the
request is refused." That is easier said than
done. A government not willing to accept an
alien will simply refuse his admittance into
its country. Thousands of deportees from
China, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Cuba and
other countries continue to be detained in
the United States because those countries are
unwilling to accept them. Those deportees
can attest to the practical difficulty, if not
impossibility, of acting anyway when a
request is refused.
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As a practical matter, then, the task of
removing an alien to a country which has
not accepted him will only be accomplished
and the majority's construction of the statute
will only be implicated when there is no
functioning government to refuse the alien's
acceptance, currently the case in Somalia.
The absurdity of such a construction lies in
the fact we require a functioning central
government as an "essential aspect" of a
"country" to which an alien can be deported.
"Learned Hand warned that, absent order,
liberty becomes license, ultimately leading
to the denial of liberty. In a world of
unbridled license, the strong do what they
will and the weak suffer what they must." I
fear if we "act anyway" by deporting Mr.
Jama to Somalia, we abuse our great
strength at the expense of the weak. With
this change in policy, we abandon a stateless
person without a passport or traveling
documents in a war-torn country victimized
by battling warlords, and without a central
government. By doing so, I fear we abandon
order and risk the doom of liberty. Because
the government's recent disregard of a well-
settled and accepted construction of
1231(b)(2) does not accord with my sense of
liberty or justice, I respectfully dissent.
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Leocal v. Ashcroft
(03-583)
Ruling Below: (Leocal v. Ashcroft, Unpublished Order, Agency Docket No. A24-665-605, 11th
Cir., 2003)
In an unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Leocal's
conviction for driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury is a "crime of
violence" under U.S. Code. Moreover, it found that the immigration court correctly applied Le v.
Attorney General, asserting that driving under the influence is a crime of violence. Once a person
is deemed to have committed a "crime of violence" the Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8
USC 1252(a)(2)(C) qualifies him as an aggravated felon. The court held that this qualification
removes their ability to question deportation proceedings.
Question Presented: Whether petitioner's conviction of driving under the influence and causing
serious bodily injury, in violation of Fla. Stat, Ann. § 316.193(3)(c)(2), is a "crime of violence"
under 18 U.S.C. 16(a) that renders petitioner removable under the immigration laws as an
aggravated felon.
Joseu LEOCAL, Petitioner
V.
John D. ASHCROFT, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Decided June 30, 2003
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH, and CARNES, Circuit Judges; PER CURIAM:
Josue Leocal petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA's")
final removal order, entered August 29,
2002. The BIA ordered Leocal removed as
an aggravated felon, finding that his
conviction under Fla. Stat. 316.193(3)(c)2
for driving under the influence ("DUI")
causing serious bodily injury qualifies as a
"crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. 16. The
government, arguing that we lack
jurisdiction, moved to dismiss the petition.
We agree. We review our subject-matter
jurisdiction de novo.
As Leocal's removal proceedings
commenced in 2000, the permanent rules of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
govern his petition for review. Under the
IIRIRA, judicial review of removal orders is
more limited than it had been under the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA").
Given the limits of 1252(a)(2)(C), we retain
jurisdiction only to determine whether
Leocal is "(1) an alien (2) who is removable
(3) based on a conviction for an offense
enumerated in the statute." Among those
offenses enumerated in the statute is 8
310
U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which allows for
removal of an alien convicted of an
aggravated felony after admission into the
United States. Thus, if Leocal is an alien
who is removable based on an aggravated
felony conviction, 1252(a)(2)(C) divests us
of jurisdiction to review the removal order.
Leocal does not dispute that he is an alien,
so we turn to the question of whether his
conviction renders him removable as an
aggravated felon.
Notwithstanding the jurisdictional bar in
1252(a)(2)(C), we retain jurisdiction to
consider "substantial constitutional issues"
arising out of the alien's removal
proceedings. Leocal does not raise any
constitutional issues on appeal.
The INA defines the term "aggravated
felony" as "a crime of violence (as defined
in § 16 of Title 18, but not including a
purely political offense) for which the term
of imprisonment is at least one year." Since
Leocal received a [two-and-a-half] year
prison sentence, the parties have focused on
whether his conviction under Fla. Stat.
316.193(3)(c)2 was for a "crime of
violence" as defined by 18 U.S.C. In Le v.
United States Attorney Gen., a panel of this
Court squarely held that it is.
"It is the firmly established rule of this
Circuit that each succeeding panel is bound
by the holding of the first panel to address
an issue of law, unless and until that holding
is overruled en banc, or by the Supreme
Court." Accordingly, Leocal's arguments as
to the wisdom of the Le decision in light of
BIA's new interpretation and the rulings of
our sister Circuits are unavailing. Further,
Leocal's arguments that we are not bound
by Le because that panel deferred to the
BIA's old interpretation are based on a
misreading of Le. The Le Court did say that
it would review the issue de novo but defer
to a reasonable interpretation of the BIA.
However, the Court's language and analysis
clearly demonstrate that it made a binding,
de novo determination that a DUI that
causes serious bodily injury to another is a
crime of violence..
We are divested of jurisdiction to review
Leocal's removal order.
DISMISSED.
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Supreme Court Roundup: Justices Agree to Hear Two Deportation Cases
The New York Times
February 24, 2004
Linda Greenhouse
An immigrant who has been deported to
Haiti and another facing imminent
deportation to Somalia persuaded the
Supreme Court on Monday to hear their
appeals, each raising a separate and disputed
question of current immigration law.
The issue in the first case is whether a
conviction for drunken driving that causes
injury can be considered an "aggravated
felony," which makes a lawful permanent
resident subject to deportation. In 2002, the
government deported Josue Leocal, a
Haitian-born resident of Miami, after he
served a two-year state prison sentence for
causing "serious bodily injury" while
driving under the influence of alcohol.
Under Florida law, that offense is a "crime
of violence," which in turn is part of the
definition of "aggravated felony" under
federal immigration law. The lower federal
courts have disagreed on whether drunken
driving can appropriately be placed in that
category. Mr. Leocal had no previous arrests
during his 19 years in the country.
The question in the second case is whether
natives of Somalia, many who came here as
refugees, can be sent back without the
consent of the Somali government.
A Somali man, Keyse G. Jama, who entered
the United States as a 17-year-old refugee in
1996, is arguing that federal law requires the
consent of the receiving country before
someone can be deported there. He was
convicted of assault in Minnesota after a
fight with another Somali man. Somalia has
no central government, and the United
States has no diplomatic relations with the
country. Nor does Somalia issue passports.
Before a federal district judge in
Minneapolis granted Mr. Jama's petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, federal immigration
officials had planned to take him to Dubai
and put him on a flight from there to
Somalia.
At that point, his lawyers say, he would have
become "a stateless person with no travel
documents or identity papers in a war-torn
region with no central government." He is
represented by Minnesota Advocates for
Human Rights and without charge by Briggs
& Morgan, a Minneapolis law firm.
An analysis of Somali deportations that was
prepared by the Justice Department's Office
of Legal Counsel in 2002 concluded that
"there exist extraordinary and temporary
conditions in Somalia" that prevent the safe
return of Somali citizens.
In both cases, the Bush administration urged
the Supreme Court to reject the appeals.
In the Somali case, Jama v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, No. 03-674, the
administration said the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in St.
Louis, had correctly interpreted immigration
law not to require the consent of the
receiving country. The appeals court
overturned the district court's grant of
habeas corpus, but delayed issuing its
opinion until the Supreme Court could
review the case,
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If consent were required, the administration
told the justices, "foreign governments could
prevent the United States from repatriating
their nationals merely be failing to indicate
acceptance of the repatriation."
The United States has deported 200 Somalis
since 1997. In a separate case last year, a
panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, based in San
Francisco, issued an injunction barring
further deportations to Somalia. The
administration is seeking a rehearing by the
full appeals court.
In the drunken driving case, Leocal v.
Ashcroft, No. 03-583, the administration
told the court that the case was inappropriate
for review for procedural reasons. The
relationship between drunken driving felony
convictions and federal immigration law
presents "difficult questions," the
administration said.
The federal appeals courts are divided on the
issue, with most ruling that drunken driving
offenses, even those involving injury or
death, cannot be considered crimes of
violence without proof of some degree of
criminal intent. In the Leocal case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, in Atlanta, held that it
lacked jurisdiction to consider Mr. Leocal's
appeal from an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals. Mr. Leocal is being
represented without charge by the King &
Spalding law firm here. [...]
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Miami-Dade Case Goes to High Court
Miami Herald
February 24, 2004
Lisa Arthur
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to
hear the appeal of a 48-year-old Miami
Dade man who was sent back to Haiti after
pleading guilty to driving drunk and causing
an accident that injured two people. Josue
Leocal, a husband and father of four who
lived in the United States legally for 20
years, had no other trouble with the law
aside from the 2000 accident. He was
deported to Haiti in November 2002.
At issue: whether driving drunk and causing
an accident with injuries should qualify as a
"crime of violence," which under
immigration law fits the definition of an
"aggravated felony" that subjects the
offender to deportation. Depending upon
what the justices do, a disputed area of
immigration law could become clearer. [...]
"The [lower] courts have gone both ways
around the country," said Leocal's attorney,
Mike Ciatti, in a telephone interview from
his Washington, D.C., office. "I think this
case will give the courts a chance to clarify
the issue and make it uniform on a
nationwide basis whether this qualifies
someone for removal from the country."
Two Years In Prison
Leocal, 48, served two years in prison after
pleading guilty to being drunk behind the
wheel when he had an accident that injured
two people in January 2000. Exact details of
the incident were not available on Monday.
Leocal, who has four children age 10 to 16,
completed a 10-month substance abuse
program while incarcerated. [...]
After his release, immigration authorities
took him into custody and deported him.
Ciatti says it's unclear whether Leocal
would be able to return to the United States
if the justices ruled in his favor.
It's also not clear whether his wife and
children went back to Haiti with him. They
are all U.S. citizens. Leocal had legal
residency status when the car accident
happened.
If Leocal had had citizen status, he'd likely
still be here, said Cheryl Little, executive
director of the Miami-based Florida
Immigration Advocacy Center. "They don't
deport citizens for that," said Little, who
was unfamiliar with Leocal's case.
"It's interesting the Supreme Court has
decided to hear the case," she added. "I hope
they do the right thing. The consequences in
these cases for immigrants can be grave."
Lucas Guttentag, director of the Immigrants
Right Project of the American Civil
Liberties Union, said it's too early to know
whether a decision in this case would have
far-reaching implications. "The case is
significant and if the justices rule a DUI
with injuries is not an aggravated felony, it
would be a rebuke to the government's
position that these crimes are crimes of
violence," Guttentag said by phone from
California.
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Immigration Case Creates Legal Stir
Pioneer Press (Minneapolis, MN)
February 2, 2003
Todd Nelson
Immigration law, normally dry and
gave rise in recent weeks
pulsequickening behind-the-scenes
worthy of Perry Mason.
arcane,
to a
drama
When the federal government moved to
deport dozens of Somalis, it triggered
courtroom showdowns in the Twin Cities,
Seattle and New Orleans.
Overnight, a cross-country network of
private lawyers armed with e-mail and cell
phones and working for free, geared up to
derail plans to return the Somalis to their
lawless African homeland. The results have
been striking, capped by a nationwide ban
on Somali deportations ordered last month
by a Seattle federal judge.
The chief weapon, as the legal wrangling
has unfolded, has been a novel legal
argument developed by Minneapolis lawyers
Jeffrey Keyes and Kevin Magnuson-
challenging the legality of deporting
Somalis to a country without a functioning
government to accept them, as U.S. law
requires. A federal judge in Minneapolis
was the first to accept the argument last
year, blocking a Minnesota Somali's
planned deportation.
In November, when immigration officials
began picking up Somalis around the
country for what appeared to be imminent
deportation, the Minneapolis lawyers'
argument was a ready-made monkey-wrench
that attorneys in Washington state and
Louisiana used to thwart the government's
plans.
As they catch their breath, those lawyers are
crediting the work of their Minnesota
counterparts with helping to forestall the
deportation .of 2,700 Somalis nationwide at
least until their homeland-racked by civil
war since 1991 - reaches some stability.
The refugees' lawyers and the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service
agree that the Somalis who have final orders
of removal-for criminal convictions or
violations of immigration law-will be
deported someday.
The Somalis hope their courtroom victories
will delay that until their country, now
largely in the hands of feuding warlords, has
a functioning central government that can
accept and protect them.
With the Somali -deportation ban in place,
advocates now hope to persuade judges to
release 15 to 20 Minnesota Somalis and a
similar number from other states who are
still in detention.
Keyes said he knew he had a strong case.
Research confirmed that the acceptance
requirement had been part of the law, and
part of the operating instructions of the INS,
for years.
What strikes Keyes as unusual is the
aggressive approach the INS has taken in
trying to remove the Somalis, even as
federal judges in Minnesota, Washington
state and Louisiana ruled against the action.
"There's a statutory framework describing
how this practice is supposed to take place,"
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said Magnuson, also of Briggs & Morgan.
"It's there for a reason. One of those reasons
is you don't deport someone to a war zone
because you can't ensure someone is going
to have a modicum of safety when they get
there."
In Seattle, Justice Department lawyers
argued that the courts had no business
second-guessing the INS in what they
contended, after the terrorist attacks of Sept.
11, 2001, was a matter of national security.
U.S. District Judge Marsha Pechman said
she found no credible link between any
organization in Somalia and Osama bin
Laden's al-Qaida terrorist network.
Humble Beginning
The legal proceedings that have put a
nationwide hold on Somali deportations
began humbly enough with the case of
Keyse Jama, a 24-year-old Somali native
who built up a lengthy rap sheet after he and
his family arrived in Minnesota as refugees
in 1996.
Jama spent a year in prison after pleading
guilty to a third-degree assault charge
stemming from a fight in Hennepin County
that substantially injured another man.
Jama's felony con-viction prompted the INS
to begin removal proceedings, and he has
been in federal custody since he got out of
prison in 2000.
Last March, however, U.S. District Judge
John Tunheim of Minneapolis blocked
Jama's deportation. The Justice Department
appealed to the 8 th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals; arguments are to take place Feb. 12
in St. Paul.
The ban on Somali deportations sets a
troubling precedent, said Mark Krikorian,
executive director of the Center for
Immigration Studies in Washington, D.C.,
which favors tighter immigration laws.
"I would suspect this is not going to stick,"
Krikorian said. "What this is is immigration
lawyers grasping at straws to prevent
deportation under any circumstances.
Immigration lawyers are endlessly ingenious
in finding ways to prevent the enforcement
of immigration laws, and this is just the
latest scheme."
The decision favoring Jama made its way to
Seattle after the November detention of
several Somalis with deportation orders
stirred community fears there.
A community group contacted Michele
Garnett McKenzie of Minnesota Advocates
for Human Rights, who had placed Jama's
case with Keyes and Magnuson. Magnuson
e-mailed documents from Jama's case to
lawyers at the Seattle firm of Perkins Coie,
where lawyers quickly tailored the argument
to suit their clients.
"They just cut and pasted," McKenzie said.
A short time later, Magnuson zapped the
documents to Louisiana, where the INS was
staging detained Somalis for deportation.
If not for the Jama decision in hand and for a
storm in Louisiana that grounded a would-be
removal flight, the Somalis probably would
have been on their way overseas.
"On that short time frame, there's no way
we could have done what we did without the
arguments already being developed by the
Minnesota lawyers," said Seattle lawyer
Karol Brown.
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U.S. Gains Strength On Deportations
Legal Times
May 5, 2003
Tony Mauro
The Supreme Court on April 29 handed the
government a big win in immigration law,
ruling 5-4 that legal aliens who commit
certain crimes in the United States can be
imprisoned pending their deportation
hearings.
But by a separate 6-3 vote, the Court also
ruled that it had jurisdiction to review the
law in the context of a habeas corpus
petition filed by an immigrant detainee.
The decision in Demore v. Kim, No. 01-
1491, while not directly related to the war
on terrorism, may have an impact on future
litigation over the Bush administration's
post-Sept. 11 detention of immigrants
suspected of having connections to terrorist
groups, says Paul Kamenar of the
Washington Legal Foundation. "It
strengthens the government's hand in all
deportation proceedings." The foundation
filed a brief supporting the government's
position and disputing the Court's
jurisdiction over the case.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who wrote
the majority opinion, noted that criminal
aliens make up one-fourth of the nation's
prison population, and that nearly one-fourth
of aliens released pending deportation don't
show up for their deportation hearings.
Responding to this trend, Congress in the
1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act required the
government to detain deportable aliens
pending their hearings. In this category are
those resident aliens who have been
convicted of aggravated felonies, multiple
crimes of "moral turpitude," and a variety of
other offenses, including drug and firearms
crimes.
Hyung Joon Kim, who emigrated from
South Korea at age 6, was a lawful
permanent resident when he was convictedin
California of theft and burglary in 1996 and
1997. After serving one and a half years in
prison, he was turned over to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service to
be held pending deportation. He filed a
habeas petition challenging the 1996 law,
and won at both the district court and
appeals court levels. He was released on
bond and now, at 25, is a college student.
The Bush administration sought
reinstatement of the law, arguing that the 9th
Circuit "straightforwardly substituted its
own policy judgment for the considered
conclusion of the political branches."
The American Civil Liberties Union and
other groups countered that detention for
these aliens could last months or years and
that the freedom from arbitrary detention
belonged to citizens and noncitizens alike.
The high court majority agreed with the
government. "Congress adopted this
provision against a backdrop of wholesale
failure by the INS to deal with increasing
rates of criminal activity by aliens," wrote
Rehnquist. "Detention during removal
proceedings is a constitutionally permissible
part of that process."
Rehnquist also said last year's ruling in
Zadvydas v. Davis did not apply to Kim's
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case. In that ruling, the Court imposed some
limits on the indefinite detention of those
who have already been ordered deported.
Rehnquist said the detention for those with
pending cases would be "of a much shorter
duration."
Justice David Souter read parts of his dissent
from the bench, arguing that legal
permanent resident aliens are "generally
indistinguishable" from citizens in terms of
their rights and obligations.
"This case is not about the National
Government's undisputed power to detain
aliens in order to avoid flight or prevent
danger to the community," wrote Souter.
"The issue is whether that power may be
exercised by detaining a still lawful
permanent resident alien when there is no
reason for it and no way to challenge it. The
Court's holding that the Due Process Clause
allows this under a blanket rule is devoid of
even ostensible justification in fact and at
odds with the settled standard of liberty. I
respectfully dissent."
Joining Souter in dissent were Justices John
Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a separate
dissent.
Three justices separately dissented on the
jurisdictional issue. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas, asserted that
throughout the nation's history, until
recently, aliens were not allowed to use
habeas to contest pending deportation. With
that background, the three agreed that
Congress could remove federal court
jurisdiction over such detention.
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Florida v. Nixon
(03-931)
Ruling Below: (Nixon v. Florida, 857 So.2d 172, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S597, Supreme Court of
Florida, 2003)
On appeal, the dispositive issue was whether defendant was entitled to a new trial under the state
supreme court's directions in the previous remand. Specifically, the issue was whether there was
competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that defendant consented
to trial counsel's strategy of conceding guilt. In the previous remand, the state supreme court
directed the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether evidence existed
which indicated an affirmative, explicit acceptance by defendant of counsel's strategy. Silent
acquiescence was not enough. Defendant never testified at the evidentiary hearing on this issue.
Trial counsel testified that defendant provided neither verbal nor nonverbal indication that he did
or did not wish to pursue counsel's strategy of conceding guilt. Thus, there was no competent,
substantial evidence which established that defendant affirmatively and explicitly agreed to
counsel's strategy. Because silent acquiescence to counsel's strategy was not sufficient, the state
supreme court found that defendant was entitled to a new trial,
Questions Presented:
1. Does defense counsel's use of a trial strategy that concedes defendant's guilt constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel if the strategy was pursued without the explicit approval of
client?
2. Should counsel be held to a standard that considers whether counsel's statements were
deficient and prejudicial to the defendant, or should counsel be considered ineffective per se?
Joe Elton NIXON, Appellant
V.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee
Supreme Court of Florida
Decided July 10, 2003
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
PER CURIAM:
Joe Elton Nixon, a prisoner under a sentence writ of habeas corpus with this Court. We
of death, appeals an order of the trial court have jurisdiction. For the reasons that
denying his motion for postconviction relief follow, we remand this case to the trial court
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure for a new trial.
3.850. Additionally, he files a petition for a
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Facts and Procedural History
Joe Elton Nixon was charged, convicted,
and sentenced to death for the 1984 murder
of a Tallahassee woman. This Court
affirmed the conviction and sentence on
direct appeal. The United States Supreme
Court denied Nixon's petition for a writ of
certiorari. Subsequently, in 1993, Nixon
filed a rule 3.850 motion, which the trial
court denied without an evidentiary hearing.
Nixon appealed the trial court's summary
denial of his 3.850 motion to this Court.
Additionally, Nixon filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus with this Court. Nixon
raised seven issues relating to the denial of
his rule 3.850 motion and three issues in his
habeas petition.
The issues raised in Nixon's appeal of the
denial of his 3.850 motion were: (1) whether
the circuit court denied him a full and fair
hearing on his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim; (2) whether he was denied
his right not to be tried while mentally
incompetent; (3) whether his death sentence
had to be set aside because his counsel failed
to make an effective argument for sparing
his life and presented evidence that was
harmful to his case during the sentencing
phase of the trial; (4) whether he was denied
a competent mental health evaluation in
violation of Ake v. Oklahoma; (5) whether
he was entitled to prove his claims under
Johnson v. Mississippi, that the two prior
convictions used as aggravating
circumstances lacked validity; (6) whether
he should have the opportunity to prove that
race discrimination tainted his conviction
and death sentence; and (7) whether the jury
weighed invalid and unconstitutionally
vague aggravating circumstances in
violation of James v. State and Jackson v.
State.
In his habeas petition Nixon argued that: (1)
appellate counsel failed to raise on direct
appeal any issue regarding Nixon's
competency to stand trial; (2) appellate
counsel failed to properly preserve Nixon's
claims under Ake v. Oklahoma; and (3)
appellate counsel failed to properly preserve
Nixon's claims under James v. State and
Jackson v. State.
In Nixon II, this Court found Nixon's claim
that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel when his lawyer conceded guilt
without his consent to be the primary issue
in the case. Nixon's counsel made the
following statement during opening
argument of the guilt phase:
In this case, there will be no
question that Jeannie Bickner
died a horrible, horrible death.
Surely she did and that will be
shown to you. In fact, that
horrible tragedy will be proved to
your satisfaction beyond any
reasonable doubt. In this case,
there won't be any question,
none whatsoever, that my client,
Joe Elton Nixon, caused Jeannie
Bickner's death. Likewise, that
fact will be proved to your
satisfaction beyond any
reasonable doubt. This case is
about the death of Joe Elton
Nixon and whether it should
occur within the next few years
by electrocution or maybe its
natural expiration after a lifetime
of confinement.
During closing argument, Nixon's counsel
made the following statement:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,
I wish I could stand before you
and argue that what happened
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wasn't caused by Mr. Nixon, but
we all know better. For several
very obvious and apparent
reasons, you have been and will
continue to be involved in a very
uniquely tragic case. In just a
little while Judge Hall will give
you some verdict forms that have
been prepared. He'll give you
some instructions on how to
deliberate this case. After you've
gotten those forms and you've
elected your foreperson and
you've done what you must do,
you will sign those forms. I know
you are not going to take this
duty lightly, and I know what
you will decide will be
unanimous. I think that what you
will decide is that the State of
Florida, Mr. Hankinson and Mr.
Guarisco, through them, has
proved its case against Joe Elton
Nixon. I think you will find that
the State has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt each and every
element of the crimes charged,
first-degree premeditated murder,
kidnapping, robbery, and arson.
On appeal, the parties were in disagreement
regarding the appropriate standard of review
to be applied in the case. The State argued
that the standard explained in Strickland v.
Washington should be applied, whereas
Nixon argued that because counsel's
concessions amounted to per se ineffective
assistance of counsel, the United States v.
Cronic standard was the proper test.
Ultimately, this Court held that if Nixon
could establish that he did not consent to
counsel's strategy, then the Court would
find counsel to be per se ineffective under
the Cronic standard. This Court reasoned
that the Cronic standard should apply
because:
Although statements made by attorneys in
closing arguments are not evidence,
nevertheless, for all practical purposes,
counsel's admission of guilt on behalf of his
client denied to petitioner his constitutional
right to have his guilt or innocence decided
by the jury. Petitioner, in pleading not
guilty, was entitled to have the issue of his
guilt or innocence presented to the jury as an
adversarial issue. Counsel's complete
concession of petitioner's guilt nullified the
adversarial quality of this fundamental issue.
Since counsel's comments operated as the
"functional equivalent of a guilty plea," this
Court concluded that "Nixon's claim must
prevail at the evidentiary hearing below if
the testimony establishes that there was not
an affirmative, explicit acceptance by Nixon
of counsel's strategy. Silent acquiescence is
not enough." To avoid similar problems in
the future, this Court said:
[W]e hold that if a trial judge
ever suspects that a similar
strategy is being attempted by
counsel for the defense, the judge
should stop the proceedings and
question the defendant on the
record as to whether or not he or
she consents to counsel's
strategy. This will ensure that the
defendant has in fact intelligently
and voluntarily consented to
counsel's strategy of conceding
guilt.
Accordingly, we remanded the case to the
trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on
the issue of whether Nixon consented to trial
counsel's strategy. This Court declined to
address the remaining issues in Nixon's
3.850 appeal. Additionally, this Court opted
not to address Nixon's habeas claims given
its disposition of his 3.850 appeal.
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On remand, an evidentiary hearing was held
before Judge Janet Ferris on May 11, 2001.
Although Nixon was present at the
evidentiary hearing, he did not testify; the
only witness presented was Michael Corin,
Nixon's trial counsel. After the hearing, the
trial court denied relief and found that Nixon
consented to counsel's strategy. This appeal
followed.
This appeal includes not only the
Strickland/Cronic issue but also the seven
issues not addressed in Nixon II. Because
we grant relief on the ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, we do not address the
other issues or the claims raised in the
habeas petition.
Law and Analysis
The dispositive issue is whether Nixon is
entitled to a new trial under this Court's
decision in Nixon II. In reaching the merits
of this issue, this Court must decide whether
there is competent, substantial evidence to
support the trial court's conclusion that
Nixon consented to trial counsel's strategy
of conceding guilt. In Nixon II, this Court
directed the trial court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether
evidence existed which indicated an
"affirmative, explicit acceptance by Nixon
of counsel's strategy. Silent acquiescence is
not enough." Nixon never testified at the
evidentiary hearing on this issue. On direct
examination, trial counsel repeatedly
testified that Nixon did nothing when asked
his opinion regarding this trial strategy.
Generally, our standard of review following
a denial of a 3.850 claim after holding an
evidentiary hearing affords deference to the
trial court's factual findings." As long as the
trial court's findings are supported by
competent substantial evidence, this Court
will not 'substitute its judgment for that of
the trial court on questions of fact, likewise
of the credibility of the witnesses as well as
the weight to be given to the evidence by the
trial court."'
Q: [Nixon's Postconviction
Counsel] Did you discuss the
strategy of not contesting guilt
with the defendant?
A: [Corin] I thought I answered
it. But if I didn't answer it, then
yes, he was advised as to that.
Q: And how did he respond?
A: To the best of my knowledge,
again he did nothing, except after
it occurred that he was not real
pleased. And I think I answered
that before also.
Q: Now what do you mean by he
did nothing?
A: He did nothing. I don't know.
I don't know what else I can say,
Mr. Evans. I have said it before.
Corin further testified that Nixon provided
neither verbal nor nonverbal indication that
he did or did not wish to pursue counsel's
strategy of conceding guilt. Thus, at most,
this testimony demonstrates silent
acquiescence by Nixon to counsel's strategy.
Corin's testimony essentially mirrored his
testimony given at the December 19, 1988,
evidentiary hearing, at which Nixon invoked
the attorney-client privilege. Thus, both the
direct and cross-examination of Corin were
extremely limited. Nonetheless, at that
hearing Corin testified that Nixon did not
affirmatively agree to his concession of
guilt. Corin also testified that Nixon did not
do or say anything to demonstrate his
approval of the trial strategy.
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The trial court indicated that it would
consider the totality of the circumstances in
making a determination of whether Nixon
affirmatively and explicitly agreed to
counsel's strategy of conceding guilt to the
charged crime. The court in its written order
noted that one of the factors that needed to
be examined was the general pattern of
Corin's interactions and communications
with Nixon. After reviewing the trial record,
Nixon I and Nixon II, the transcript of the
evidentiary hearing conducted on December
19, 1988, and Corin's testimony at the May
11, 2001, evidentiary hearing, the trial court
found that Nixon's pattern of interactions
with counsel involved information being
provided by Corin, followed by silence from
Nixon. In essence, the trial court found that
Nixon's failure to approve or disapprove
verbally was approval of counsel's strategy.
In Nixon I, we found that counsel's
comments at trial were the functional
equivalent of a guilty plea. Since counsel's
comments operated as a guilty plea, in order
to affirm the trial court's ruling, the record
must contain substantial evidence which
would enable this Court to determine that
Nixon did more than silently submit to
counsel's strategy. There is no evidence that
shows that Nixon affirmatively, explicitly
agreed with counsel's strategy. The only
evidence presented at the evidentiary
hearing was Corin's testimony, which
indicated that Nixon neither agreed nor
disagreed with counsel's trial strategy. Thus,
there is no competent, substantial evidence
which establishes that Nixon affirmatively
and explicitly agreed to counsel's strategy.
Without a client's affirmative and explicit
consent to a strategy of admitting guilt to the
crime charged or a lesser included offense,
counsel's duty is to "hold the State to its
burden of proof by clearly articulating to the
jury or fact-finder that the State must
establish each element of the crime charged
and that a conviction can only be based upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Since we
held in Nixon II that silent acquiescence to
counsel's strategy is not sufficient, we find
that Nixon must be given a new trial.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this
opinion and in our opinion in Nixon II, we
reverse the trial court's denial of
postconviction relief and remand for a new
trial. In light of our disposition of Nixon's
rule 3.850 appeal, Nixon's habeas corpus
petition is dismissed as moot. It is so
ordered.
ANSTEAD, PARIENTE,
CANTERO concur:
QUINE, and
I concur in the majority opinion because it
simply reaffirms a fundamental principle
long ago established by the United States
Supreme Court and consistently adhered to
by courts, that counsel cannot enter a plea of
guilty to a criminal indictment without the
express consent of the defendant. [...]
[The concurrence cites numerous cases
supporting the proposition that counsel may
not submit a guilty plea or concede to a
defendant's crimes without express
consent.]
I share and understand the frustration of my
colleagues in dissent. This is a difficult case
for several reasons, not the least of which is
the substantial evidence of the defendant's
guilt. I do not question the competence or
experience of trial counsel. Neither do I
underestimate the frustration counsel must
have experienced with such a disruptive and
uncooperative client. Nor do I question that
the strategy taken by defense counsel was an
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effective one reasonably calculated to help
the defendant avoid the death penalty. [...]
Yet.. .the absence of certain knowledge of
whether Nixon consented to counsel's
strategy, the process for determining guilt or
innocence was utterly flawed in this case. If
Nixon did not consent, then a number of his
constitutional rights were violated: he did
not have a fair trial, he did not have effective
representation, he was not seen as innocent
until proven guilty, and the government was
not held to its burden of establishing its case
beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite his
difficult behavior, Nixon was still entitled to
his constitutional rights. [...]
LEWIS, concurring in result only.
I concur in result only because I am
compelled to do so solely and exclusively by
the doctrine of law of the case. Although the
decision and result here are, in my view,
both legally and logically incorrect, the
"roadmap to reversal" was previously
drawn, and the misdirection of the correct
applicable legal concepts written in Nixon v.
Singletary, which has become commonly
referred to as Nixon II with which I
dissented at the time. As unfortunate and
convoluted as these legal and factual
circumstances may be, I am bound by the
prior decision of this Court and will honor
its precedent.
DISSENT; WELLS:
I dissent because I conclude that this Court's
granting to defendant Nixon a new trial is
legally wrong and not justified or
demonstrated to be required by the majority
opinion.
It has now been almost nineteen years since
Ms. Bickner was abducted from the
Governor's Square Mall in Tallahassee and
murdered. This same issue upon which a
new trial is now granted by the majority has
been framed in this record since Judge Hall
made his statement at the close of the trial
proceedings in 1985. Clearly, this same
issue was in the record when this Court
affirmed Nixon's conviction and sentence of
death in 1990.
Then, in 2000, if this Court was going to
grant a new trial on this issue, the question
was expressly before this Court.
[The Court outlines the remand to circuit for
an evidentiary hearing and the defendant's
subsequent appeal back to the state's highest
court].
The Supreme Court found that the need for
affirmative, explicit acceptance of this trial
strategy emanates from the principle that "...
the defendant, not the attorney, is the captain
of the ship. [...] Although the attorney can
make some tactical decisions, the ultimate
choice as to which direction to sail is left up
to the defendant. The question is not
whether the route taken was correct; rather
the question is whether Nixon approved the
course." The Supreme Court's remand
appears limited to one issue: did Joe Elton
Nixon give his attorney, Mike Corin,
consent to concede guilt at trial, and was
that consent supported or evidenced by an
"affirmative, explicit acceptance by Nixon"
of this specific aspect of the trial strategy?
One might suspect that such a question
could be answered quickly and easily
following a brief hearing. Unfortunately,
that is not the case. Not only has there been
disagreement about the status of Mr.
Nixon's other post-conviction claims, but
there is continuing dispute about the
appropriate legal standard to be employed in
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resolving claims such as this. The State has
forcefully argued that the Florida Supreme
Court's understanding of United States v.
Cronic, supra, is flawed, and that recent
federal court decisions interpreting Cronic
have explicitly rejected the Supreme Court's
analysis of the issue. The State argues here,
as it has recently in the United States
Supreme Court, that the Florida Supreme
Court's interpretation of Cronic is "overly
expansive" and is contrary to the holding of
the seminal post-conviction case of
Strickland v. Washington, supra.
During his conversation with Judge Hall in
the holding cell, Mr. Nixon rarely answered
the question posed to him, and at one point
flatly refused to answer any more questions.
The colloquy between Mr. Nixon and Judge
Hall shows that Mr. Nixon was generally
unresponsive to Judge Hall's patient
inquiries, and consciously evaded answering
the judge's questions regarding his refusal to
enter the courtroom. The Supreme Court
accepted Judge Hall's finding that Mr.
Nixon's extraordinary behavior constituted a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver
of his attendance at the trial. That waiver,
however, was based on the judge's finding
that if Mr. Nixon failed to return to the
courtroom after the recess, he would be
consenting to proceeding without him.
Mr. Corin did the best he could with a
difficult case and a difficult client. In
resolving post-conviction claims, defendants
urge trial courts to revisit each and every
decision made by an attorney before, during
and after a trial. Increasing numbers of
motions to withdraw pleas are filed, and
post-conviction motions asserting misadvice
of counsel leading up to entry of a plea have
flooded the trial courts. At their core are
various assumptions about a criminal
defendant's "right" to perfection in his or
her representation.
Mr. Corn's conduct as an attorney in this
case must be evaluated by the objective
standards described in the case law
articulated by the United States Supreme
Court, the Florida Supreme Court, and our
District Courts of Appeal. That objective
standard also must be applied to the facts
and circumstances of this case, without
resort to unfair presumptions about what
should have occurred.
Relying on the trial record, the two reported
decisions of the Florida Supreme Court
addressing Mr. Nixon's case, and the
evidentiary hearings conducted on
December 19, 1988 and May 11, 2001, this
court finds that Mr. Nixon did consent to the
trial strategy of conceding guilt. His consent
occurred as a part of his natural pattern of
communication with Mr. Corin, wherein Mr.
Corin would discuss these matters with Mr.
Nixon, and Mr. Nixon would refuse to
respond. The court further finds that the fact
that Mr. Nixon did not provide counsel with
an affirmative, explicit consent in words,
and in the manner that we ordinarily expect
and presume is acceptable, does not mean
that it was not given.
Were we now to craft a legal standard
requiring articulation for every knowing and
voluntary waiver of rights, where other
evidence exists to support the conclusion
that a knowing and voluntary waiver
occurred, we will create a standard that is
impossible to meet. We may also encourage
the creation of situations that will be
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impossible to resolve: if, after jeopardy
attaches in a jury trial, the defendant merely
refuses to answer a judge's questions about
his or her presence at the trial, agreement
with trial strategies such as conceding guilt
on some charges but not others, or testifying
at trial, what is the appropriate resolution of
such an obvious stalemate? Trial courts must
be given the opportunity to resolve such
matters based upon the facts, rather than the
existence or non-existence of certain words.
In the case at bar, Mr. Nixon's actions speak
clearly. We cannot now search for words
that he was clearly disinclined to provide.
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Man Gets New Trial in '84 Killing: Court says Nixon Did Not Agree to Defense Strategy
The Tallahassee Democrat
July 11, 2003
James L. Rosica
The Florida Supreme Court Thursday
ordered a new trial for the man convicted of
abducting a woman from the Governor's
Square mall parking lot, tying her to a tree
with jumper cables and burning her to death
in August 1984. The court in a 5-2 opinion
said there was no indication that Joe Elton
Nixon ever agreed to his lawyer's trial
strategy: admitting that he killed Jeanne
Bickner to avoid the death penalty.
"Since [...] silent acquiescence to counsel's
strategy is not sufficient, we find that Nixon
must be given a new trial," the ruling said.
Nixon, now 41, was convicted and
sentenced to death for killing Bickner, a 38-
year-old state employee. He is on Death
Row at the Union Correctional Institution.
It's unlikely, however, that Nixon will go
back on trial anytime soon, because State
Attorney Willie Meggs could decide to
appeal the ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court,
which could take a year or more.
Nixon did not participate in his own defense,
refusing to talk to his lawyer, Assistant
Public Defender Michael Corin, at his July
1985 trial. At one point, Nixon refused to
come out of his holding cell during the trial.
"It's very welcome that the court has
recognized that a trial in which only one side
is heard is not a fair trial," said Eric
Freedman, a New York City lawyer now
representing Nixon.
Meggs, whose office originally prosecuted
Nixon, said he would not comment until he
had read the 35-page opinion. Meggs could
not be reached late Thursday. But Freedman
said Meggs' prosecutors have told him they
would appeal the ruling if Nixon won.
"When (Nixon) was in his cell, huddled in a
blanket, you could say he was malingering.
We say he was completely mentally
incompetent to stand trial," Freedman said.
"His concern about the original trial was that
he was set up to railroad him into the
electric chair."
But when asked whether Nixon was more
cooperative with him than he was with
Corin, Freedman said, "We're not going to
talk about that." And when asked about a
new defense, he would say only, "Come to
the trial."
Confession at issue
But there's one problem: Nixon confessed to
the crime to investigators and family
members, according to court records. "The
existence of a confession does not
necessarily prove guilt," Freedman said.
Corin, who still is an assistant public
defender, declined comment through his
boss, Public Defender Nancy Daniels.
Daniels said she also would not discuss the
case or the court's Thursday decision.
Since the July 1985 guilty verdict, the case -
like many death penalty cases has been tied
up in appeals. The last decision was by
Circuit Judge Janet Ferris of Tallahassee,
who ruled in September 2001 that Nixon did
not deserve another trial and did
"communicate" with Corin. "... Nixon is
often more comfortable communicating
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through his behavior [...] the lack of words
cannot, and did not, render his
communication any less clear or explicit,"
she wrote.
Chief Justice Harry Lee Anstead and
Justices Barbara J. Pariente, Peggy A.
Quince, Raoul G. Cantero III and R. Fred
Lewis agreed in Thursday's
majority opinion.
Lewis said he concurred only because he
was honoring the court's prior decisions in
the case. A previous ruling said that Nixon
and other criminal defendants must
"affirmatively consent" to the defense
strategy and that "silent acquiescence is not
enough."
Otherwise, he said, "... this court is
rewarding an intentionally disruptive
defendant and misdirecting a fair and just
determination of the issues," adding, "It is
clear that everyone, including Nixon, was
aware of the trial strategy . [...]"
Justice Charles T. Wells dissented, and
retired Justice Leander J. Shaw joined.
Wells referred to a previous opinion he
wrote in the case: "The record has been clear
[...] that Nixon set about not to 'explicitly
accept' anything. This was part and parcel of
his disruptive and noncooperative conduct."
Wells concluded his dissent succinctly: "I
agree with Judge Ferris." Supreme Court
spokesman Craig Waters explained that
retired justices, such as Shaw, generally
finish the cases they began considering
before their retirement.
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High Court to Review Slaying; Tallahassee Case Tests Rules for Defense Lawyers
The Tallahassee Democrat
March 2, 2004
Democrat Staff and Wire
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to hear an appeal by the Florida Attorney
General's Office in the case of convicted
murderer Joe Elton Nixon, who last year
was granted a new trial by the state Supreme
Court. The Tallahassee case tests rules for
defense lawyers in death-penalty cases.
Nixon's lawyer, Assistant Public Defender
Michael Corin, told a jury his client was
guilty and focused on trying to persuade
jurors not to sentence Nixon to death.
Nixon was convicted in the 1984 murder of
Jeanne Bickner, a 38-year-old state
employee he accosted outside Governor's
Square mall. He tied her to a tree with
jumper cables and set her on fire, evidence
showed.
Corin's strategy did not work, and the jury
sentenced Nixon to death. The Florida
Supreme Court ruled that Corin did not
effectively represent Nixon because Nixon
did not explicitly agree to the strategy.
"The Florida Supreme Court failed to give
any deference to trial counsel's 'strategic
choices' or to his evaluation of the risks of
contesting guilt when the evidence of guilt
was overwhelming," state lawyers told the
U.S. justices in a filing.
Nixon, 42, now is on Death Row at Union
Correctional Institution, according to the
Department of Corrections' database. Nixon
did not participate in his own defense,
refusing to talk with Corin and others at his
July 1985 trial. At one point, Nixon refused
to come out of his holding cell during the
trial.
Nixon confessed to the crime to
investigators and family members,
according to court records, but Freedman
added, "The existence of a confession does
not necessarily prove guilt."
Since the July 1985 guilty verdict, the case
has been under appeal. Circuit Judge Janet
Ferris ruled in September 2001 that Nixon
did not deserve another trial and did
"communicate" with Corin. "... Nixon is
often more comfortable communicating
through his behavior [...] the lack of words
cannot, and did not, render his
communication any less clear or explicit,"
she wrote.
The state's highest court disagreed: "Since
[...] silent acquiescence to counsel's strategy
is not sufficient, we find that Nixon must be
given a new trial," its ruling said.
Justice Charles T. Wells dissented, however,
writing: "The record has been clear [...] that
Nixon set about not to 'explicitly accept'
anything. This was part and parcel of his
disruptive and noncooperative conduct."
The case will be argued before the U.S.
Supreme Court in the fall.
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The Defense Wishes to Rest: Lawyers Avoid 'Hassle' of Death Penalty
Newsday
November 26, 2001
Stephanie Saul
Twelve years ago, W. Sebastian Moore
found out the hard way that he didn't want
to handle court-appointed death penalty
cases.
Moore, one of the few criminal defense
attorneys in Jackson, Miss., says a death
penalty case nearly ruined his practice.
"When I started [with the case], I had two
people working for me - a three-man law
firm," recalls Moore. "When I got through,
they were gone. They worked like hell and
didn't get paid for it."
Moore estimates that his cost to research and
try the case was $50,000. His firm was paid
a total of $2,500. The defendant was
convicted but spared a death sentence.
Now, when a judge calls to appoint him,
Moore says, "Your honor, I don't take those
cases."
Death penalty work doesn't pay. And there
are other reasons lawyers don't want to take
the cases community pressures against
representing accused murderers, the time
and dedication required to prepare, the
emotional toll of losing when it means death
for a client, as well as the likelihood that, if
a client is convicted, a lawyer's
effectiveness will be challenged in appeals.
Mississippi's Supreme Court recently
decreed that appointed death penalty
attorneys be paid $25 an hour for office
expenses in addition to the $1,000 statutory
fee limitation. But Jackson, Miss., Judge
William Coleman says the cases are "still a
money loser." Similar limits exist in many
other southern and rural states.
Even in urban states, where compensation is
higher, fees fall far below what successful
criminal defense lawyers would charge.
Chicago attorney Jed Stone recalls his work
in a 1989 death case in rural Illinois. His bill
came to $85,000. He was paid $16,000.
Most death penalty experts estimate that it
takes from 500 to 1,000 hours to prepare and
try a case, according to Bryan Stevenson,
executive director of the Alabama Capital
Representation Resource Center, a non-
profit organization that aids in defense in
death penalty cases.
"On these death penalty cases, the law
changes every year or so," Moore said.
"And you have to do a lot of research to read
every statute, every U.S. Supreme Court
decision, and every Mississippi Supreme
Court decision specifically to see how it
applies to death cases."
Marvin White, an assistant attorney general
in Mississippi who handles capital cases,
says many lawyers shun them because their
representation might be challenged later on
appeal.
"Most people, after they've handled one or
two of these cases, don't want to fool with
them anymore," White said. "You try a case
like that, and for the rest of your career,
you're being tried. Post-conviction counsel
come in and charge trial counsel with
ineffective assistance. It's just a hassle that
most of them don't want to deal with."
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With experienced and competent criminal
defense lawyers reluctant to take the cases,
judges often are forced to appoint recent law
school graduates or unsuccessful lawyers.
"They're doing court-appointed work
primarily because they can't do anything
else," said Stephen Bright, director of the
Atlanta-based Southern Center for Human
Rights, which represents death row inmates
on appeal. "I've yet to see an Atticus Finch
in my practice," he said, referring to the
appointed attorney who doggedly defended
accused rapist Tom Robinson in "To Kill a
Mockingbird."
Lawyers who take the cases, particularly in
small southern towns, often get criticized by
potential clients.
"He's going to be stopped by people at the
Dairy Queen and asked how he could ever
defend a murderer," Bright said.
One lawyer in a Georgia death penalty case
admitted in a subsequent hearing that
community pressure affected his handling of
the case.
The lawyer was representing Terry Lee
Goodwin of Monroe, Ga. Goodwin
confessed to robbing and stabbing to death a
friend. He was mentally retarded, with one
expert putting his mental age at nine years,
six months.
During the trial the lawyer and his co-
counsel told the jury they had been
appointed to represent Goodwin.
The lawyer later explained in a hearing on
his effectiveness: "You live in the
community and you get a reputation of
representing [...] everybody that killed
somebody. Well, they don't like you."
The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
Goodwin's conviction, finding that the
lawyer's concerns about community
ostracism impaired his defense.
"Fears of negative reaction to the thought of
representing an unpopular defendant surely
hamper every facet of counsel's functions,"
the court said.
In another highly publicized death penalty
case in Seminole County, Ga. in which a
group of men killed six members of a family
in their trailer several appointed lawyers
publicly stated they wanted to be dismissed
from the case.
One attorney said the appointment "was the
worst thing that ever happened to me."
Another likened it to taking a dose of
laxative.
In part because of the attorneys' statements,
the I Ith Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a
new trial for one of the defendants, Wayne
Carl Coleman, who was under sentence of
death.
Emotional stress also keeps lawyers from
wanting death penalty cases. "In most of
these cases, the evidence of guilt is
overwhelming," said Coleman. "The
attorney's main job is to keep his client
alive. It's an awesome task."
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New trial revives old nightmares: Court's decision shocks jurors from 1985 case
The Tallahassee Democrat
July 14, 2003
James L. Rosica
Sometimes, years after a trial, there are
hidden victims of a crime: jurors. Listening
to testimony and seeing graphic photographs
can take a toll. And when convictions are
overturned on appeal, it can pick at the
emotional scabs that cover jurors' memories.
For two of the jurors in Joe Elton Nixon's
July 1985 murder trial, last week's Florida
Supreme Court decision to grant him a new
trial revived old horrors.
"I am livid about this. It was such a
horrendous crime," said juror Sissy Stock,
who was then a 33-year-old staff assistant
for the Florida Legislature. "The trial was so
traumatizing."
At one point, Stock said that she broke down
crying and that Circuit Judge J. Hall Jr. had
to temporarily stop the trial. "It was that
brutal."
And for months afterward, "I would have
nightmares of the crime scene photographs,"
she said. "(They) were so horrendous."
Last week, the state's high court ordered a
new trial for Nixon, who confessed to killing
Jeanne Bickner, a 38-year-old state worker,
Aug. 12, 1984. The jury convicted Nixon,
who is sentenced to death.
Nixon walked up to Bickner in the parking
lot of Governor's Square mall near Sears to
ask for a pair of jumper cables, according to
records. What happened next, prosecutors
said, was a study in depravity: He knocked
her unconscious, stuffed her into the trunk of
her orange MG convertible and drove to a
remote area off Tram Road.
There, he tied her with the jumper cables
between two pine trees, beat and choked her,
made her take off her undergarments to
scare her, then set her on fire.
But, by a 5-2 vote, the court ruled there was
no indication that Nixon ever agreed to his
lawyer's trial strategy: avoiding a death
sentence by admitting he killed Bickner.
Nixon refused to talk to his lawyer,
Assistant Public Defender Michael Corin.
He also refused to attend the trial. According
to reports, he holed up in a holding cell after
stripping off his clothes and demanding that
he have a black attorney and a black judge.
Nixon, now on Death Row at Union
Correctional Institution, has a personal Web
page, seeking pen pals.
"I'm seeking a bright ray of sunshine to
shine upon me and my life," he wrote. "I am
surrounded by darkness daily and at times
overwhelmed with deep loneliness [...] (I
am) someone you don't have to worry about
degrading you, but most of all, someone you
can confide in and not have to worry about
being hurt in the end for doing so."
"The whole thing stinks," said Stock, now
self-employed as a personal chef. "He had a
choice. He could have spoken to his
attorney. [...J I feel like picketing the
courthouse over this."
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Juror Leigh Humphreys, then a chemist for
the state Department of Agriculture, said she
also was disappointed by last week's ruling.
She recalled listening to Nixon's taped
confession to investigators.
"I listened as he laughed and snickered
about how he murdered Ms. Bickner and
then drove her car around town," said
Humphreys, now a bureau chief for the
Agriculture Department. "I can only imagine
how her family must feel about reliving the
absolute horror of her death."
Bickner's brother, Don Roberts of Roanoke,
Va., said last week's decision surprised him.
But, he added, "we need to respect the law
and trust in the process. [...]
"I realize the death penalty is a pretty sticky
situation for the justice system, as well as
for many religions," said Roberts, a retired
Methodist minister.
Jeanne Bickner grew up in Hampton, Va.
She moved to Tallahassee in 1978 to work
for the state. She joined John Wesley United
Methodist Church in 1980 and sang alto in
the choir. In 1982, she and her husband,
David Bickner, divorced after a 14-year
marriage. He could not be reached for
comment.
Humphreys remembered hearing testimony
about why Nixon killed Bickner. He wanted
her car to impress and win back his ex-
girlfriend, who was dating his brother.
Nixon told investigators he had to kill
Bickner because he knew she could identify
him.
Nearly two decades later, Humphreys said,
"We were there for a brief period of time.
They (Bickner's family) have to live it
forever."
But Stock said she lives it every time she
goes to the mall.
"I can't even go to the Sears parking lot,"
she said. "I get nauseous."
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Crawford v. Martinez
(03-0878)
Ruling Below: (Unpublished Order Filed: August 18, 2003, Ninth Circuit)
The court below held that Zadvydas v. Davis' six-month rule requires the release from detention
of an excludable Mariel Cuban with an extensive criminal history. The court determined that,
because petitioner's removal to Cuba was "extremely unlikely" and he had been in immigration
detention for more than six months, Zadvydas should be extended to an inadmissible alien and
"compel [led]" the respondent's release.
Question Presented:
Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a) (6) and Zadyydas v. Davis authorize the indefinite detention of an
immigrant apprehended at the border, denied admission, and ordered to be removed from the
United States?
Sergio Suarez MARTINEZ
V.
John D. ASHCROFT, Appellant
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided August 18, 2003
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
Before SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, TASHIMA:
[Here, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirms the findings of the trial court based
upon the ruling in Xi v. INS. Below, the
court affirmed the holding of Zadvydas v.
Davis, requiring the INS to limit an alien's
post-removal period detention to a
reasonable time. Moreover, the court below
asserted that under Xi, the reasonable time
protocol applied to aliens deemed
inadmissible to the U.S. The court
authorized a supervised release from
detention for Martinez.]
Appellee's motion for summary disposition
is granted because the questions raised in
this appeal are so insubstantial as not to
require further argument. Accordingly, we
summarily affirm the district court's
judgment.
All other pending motions are denied as
moot.
AFFIRMED.
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Benitez v. Wallis
(03-7434)
Ruling Below: (Benitez v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289, Eleventh Circuit)
Under Zadvydas v. Davis, Benitez did not have a constitutionally-protected right to be free from
detention. The court distinguished admitted aliens from non-admitted aliens and held that the
language and legislative history of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) allowed for Benitez's detention.
Questions Presented:
1. Whether 8 U.S.C § 1231 (a) (6) and Zadyydas v. Davis authorize the indefinite detention of an
immigrant apprehended at the border and whether these sources draw a distinction between
admitted and non-admitted aliens for the purpose of detention?
Daniel BENITEZ, Petitioner-Appellant
V.
Robert WALLIS, Respondent-Appellee
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Decided July 17, 2003
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
DUBINA, BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:
Daniel Benitez, a native and citizen of Cuba,
is an inadmissible alien who brought this §
2241 petition challenging his indefinite
detention. The district court concluded that
the INS's determinations that Benitez posed
a danger to the community and was likely to
engage in further violent behavior were
facially legitimate and bona fide reasons to
detain Benitez until removal to Cuba is
possible. Consequently, the district court
denied Benitez's § 2241 petition. After
review and oral argument, we affirm.
I. Background
In 1980, Daniel Benitez attempted entry into
the United States from the port of Mariel,
Cuba and, in effect, was stopped at the
border. Benitez then was paroled into the
United States pursuant to 212(d)(5) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA"). Under 1182(d)(5), the Attorney
General may "in his discretion parole into
the United States temporarily under such
conditions as he may prescribe only on a
case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian
reasons or significant public benefit any
alien applying for admission to the United
States."
In 1983, Benitez was convicted in Dade
County, Florida, of second degree grand
theft and was sentenced to three years'
probation. Sometime thereafter, Benitez
submitted an application to adjust his status
to that of a lawful permanent resident. Under
applicable immigration laws, Cuban
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refugees may apply for permanent resident
status once they: (1) have been paroled into
the United States; (2) have been physically
present in the United States for one year;
and (3) are eligible to receive an immigrant
visa and are admissible to the United States
for permanent residence.
A second application for adjustment of
status filed by Benitez was denied in 1990
for lack of prosecution. In 1993, Benitez
pled guilty to a multi-count criminal
indictment in Florida state
court. Specifically, Benitez pled guilty to
armed burglary of a structure, armed
burglary of a conveyance, armed robbery,
unlawful possession of a firearm while
engaged in a criminal offense, carrying a
concealed firearm, aggravated battery, and
unlawful possession, sale or delivery of a
firearm with an altered or removed serial
number. The state court sentenced Benitez
to 20 years' imprisonment. Based on his
1993 criminal convictions in Florida, the
INS determined that Benitez's continued
immigration parole was against the public
interest. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d)(2),
the INS revoked Benitez's immigration
parole. [.. . In 1994, Benitez was found
excludable and deportable to Cuba because
of his criminal convictions in Florida.
Benitez's status then was reviewed pursuant
to the Cuban Review Plan to determine
whether it was in the public interest to
release him from INS custody. On
November 6, 2001, Benitez appeared before
the Cuban Review Panel. Before the Cuban
Review Panel makes a recommendation that
a detainee be granted parole, a majority of
the Panel must conclude that: " (i) The
detainee is presently a nonviolent person;
(ii) The detainee is likely to remain
nonviolent; (iii) The detainee is not likely to
pose a threat to the community following his
release; and (iv) The detainee is not likely to
violate the conditions of his parole."
On January 11, 2002, Benitez filed this §
2241 petition challenging his indefinite
detention by the INS. On January 17, 2002,
Benitez received a Notice of Releaseability,
in which a Cuban Review Panel concluded
that Benitez was releaseable under the
criteria established by the Cuban Review
Plan at such time as the INS determined that
a suitable sponsorship to a half-way house
could be arranged.
Benitez, proceeding pro se before the district
court, asserted that his indefinite detention
was unconstitutional in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Zadvydas v. Davis.
According to the district court, the fact that
Benitez was a "non-admitted parolee" made
Zadvydas inapplicable because Zadvydas
limited its holding to resident aliens. The
district court concluded that the INS
reasonably determined that Benitez was a
danger to the community and was likely to
engage in future criminal conduct. The
district court further concluded that these
determinations warranted Benitez's
detention until he could be removed to
Cuba. Finding no constitutional or statutory
prohibition against Benitez's indefinite
detention, the district court denied Benitez's
§ 2241 petition. Benitez timely appealed,
and this Court, in its discretion, appointed
counsel to represent Benitez on appeal.
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II. Discussion
Benitez does not challenge the fact that he
(1) attempted to enter illegally the United
States, (2) never formally has been admitted
into this country, and (3) is properly subject
to removal. Instead, Benitez filed his § 2241
petition arguing only that his indefinite
detention is impermissible given the
Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas. On
appeal, Benitez asserts that his indefinite
detention violates both the United States
Constitution and federal law.
The INS continues to detain Benitez
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) Thus, we
first discuss § 1231(a)(6) and how the
Supreme Court interpreted § 1231(a)(6) in
Zadvydas. We then analyze the legal issues
presented in Benitez's appeal.
A. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)
After an alien, such as Benitez, is ordered
removed from the United States, the
Attorney General must attempt to secure the
alien's removal within 90 days. "Under no
circumstance during the removal period
shall the Attorney General release an alien
who has been found inadmissible. [...]"
Congress, however, recognized that securing
an alien's actual removal within 90 days is
not always possible. Consequently, [...] the
Attorney General [can] detain aliens beyond
the 90-day removal period...
B. Zadvydas
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court expressly
addressed whether the government's
authority under § 1231(a)(6) to detain two
legal permanent residents beyond the 90-day
removal period allowed the government to
detain them indefinitely. The two legal
permanent residents were ordered removed
based on criminal convictions. The
government, however, could not effectuate
their removal because no country would
accept them.
The district court ordered Zadvydas released
under supervision because it believed that
"the Government would never succeed in its
efforts to remove Zadvydas from the United
States, leading to his permanent
confinement, contrary to the Constitution."
The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding "that
Zadvydas' detention did not violate the
Constitution because eventual deportation
was not 'impossible,' good-faith efforts to
remove him from the United States
continued, and his detention was subject to
periodic administrative review."
In evaluating indefinite detention in
Zadvydas, the Supreme Court considered
whether indefinite detention of resident
aliens, if authorized by § 1231(a)(6) as the
government contended, would present
constitutional problems. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that the two resident alien
petitioners in Zadvydas enjoyed certain
constitutional privileges associated with
individuals who have gained entry into the
United States. "But once an alien enters the
country, the legal circumstance changes, for
the Due Process Clause applies to all
'persons' within the United States, including
aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent."
The Supreme Court then recognized six
months as a presumptively reasonable time
of post-removal-period detention for
resident aliens.
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C. Circuit Split Post-Zadvydas
A circuit split has developed as to whether
Zadvydas limits only the government's
authority to detain resident aliens or whether
Zadvydas applies to all categories of aliens.
D. Benitez Is an Inadmissible Alien
Any discussion of Benitez's rights in the
immigration context must also start with the
fundamental difference in the legal status of
(1) unadmitted aliens and (2) resident aliens
who have effected "entry" into the United
States, whether illegally or legally. This
critical difference not only was recognized
in Zadvydas, but has been a hallmark of
immigration law for more than a hundred
years. [...]
E. Constitutional Analysis
This Court then addressed the concerns of
the critics of a policy or legal system that
allowed for the indefinite detention of
aliens. The Jean Court concluded "that we
must resist the temptation to tamper with the
authority of the Executive by ruling that
excludable aliens have constitutional rights
[against indefinite detention], even with
regard to their applications for parole."
F. Statutory Right under § 1231(a)(6)
Although Benitez does not have a
constitutional right precluding indefinite
detention, we also must consider whether he
has a statutory right under § 1231(a)(6),
post-Zadvydas, prohibiting indefinite
detention.
Because Zadvydas was qualified in so many
respects and reads like an as-applied
decision, we conclude that the Supreme
Court left the law, and it seems to us the
statutory scheme too, intact with respect to
inadmissible aliens who never have been
admitted into the United States. [... ]
Creating a right to parole for unadmitted
aliens after six months would create an
unprotected spot in this country's defense of
its borders.
Benitez engaged in serious criminal conduct
while paroled into this country. Even after
his parole was revoked based on his criminal
convictions, the INS again issued a Notice
of Releaseability, but later revoked that
Notice based on its determination that
Benitez still refused to conform his conduct
to the laws of this nation. We decline to read
§ 1231(a)(6) so as to deprive the Executive
Branch of this authority absent an express
statement from the Supreme Court to the
contrary.
[ ... ] Ideally Benitez should be returned as
soon as possible to his own country.
However, this cannot happen if his own
country will not allow it. In light of the fact
that the Supreme Court in Zadvydas went to
such great lengths to distinguish
inadmissible aliens, we shall not fetter that
discretion by presumptively requiring their
release into this country after six months.
[...] It is without question that Congress had
a contrary intention when enacting IIRIRA:
it sought to tighten immigration regulations.
Inadmissible aliens such as Benitez never
truly have resided in this country free from
restraint. Rather, Congress has bestowed on
them the luxury of parole while their
immigration applications and status are
finalized. To pervert this gift from Congress
into a right after six months not only would
distort Congress's intent and potentially
create grave security concerns for the people
of the United States, but also would create
needless difficulties in how the INS
AFFIRMED.
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High Court to Decide Fate of Daniel Benitez, a Mariel Refugee in Indefinite Detention
The Miami Herald
April 18, 2004
Alfonso Chardy
Daniel Benitez may well become a figure in
U.S. legal history when the Supreme Court
rules on his case this year.
Benitez, a former Miami resident, is one of
two cases the high court will review in
October to decide whether immigration
authorities can detain foreign nationals
indefinitely, including Cuban Mariel
inmates whose government refuses to take
them back.
Benitez, 46, sums up his predicament
simply.
"Let me go free or send me back to Cuba,"
he said in a recent interview at a federal
prison near Denver.
Benitez argued in his October petition to the
Supreme Court that there is no valid reason
to keep him in detention because he has
served his sentence and the high court itself
has ruled against indefinite detention.
If the justices agree, the decision will have a
wide impact - likely resulting in the
immediate release of about 900 Mariel
detainees at various federal facilities
nationwide.
"This case presents an opportunity for the
court to redress a long standing injustice,"
said Judy Rabinovitz of the American Civil
Liberties Union who has been at the
forefront of the issue.
Though the Supreme Court ruled in 2001
that foreign nationals cannot be detained
indefinitely, it did not resolve the question
of whether Mariel detainees like Benitez can
go free. The reason: the court said foreigners
who had technically not gained entry into
the country "would present a very different
question" from those lawfully admitted or
snuck in. Mariel detainees are considered
stopped at the border, thus unadmitted.
The Bush administration interpreted the
Supreme Court ruling as exempting Mariel
detainees, but not everyone agrees with that
analysis. Since the ruling, federal appeals
courts have been split, some favoring
release; others not.
Two Diferent Cases
The high court chose two radically different
Mariel cases to settle the issue: Benitez,
whose appeals court in Atlanta refused
release, and Sergio Suarez Martinez, whose
appeals court in San Francisco ordered
supervised release.
Benitez's rap sheet is long. He was first
convicted in 1983 and was sentenced to
three years probation for grand theft in Dade
County. He got convicted again in 1993,
also in Dade, for armed robbery, aggravated
battery and unlawful possession of a
firearm. He was sentenced to 20 years, but
served eight.
Sweeping Law
But when Benitez was about to be released
early in 2001, immigration authorities took
him into custody. A sweeping 1996 law
authorizes detention of foreign nationals
convicted of felonies pending deportation -
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even if the conviction occurred prior to
passage of the law.
He started writing legal briefs, asking
federal courts to release him, after the
Supreme Court ruled that foreign nationals
could not be detained indefinitely.
A North Florida federal court rejected his
petition. He appealed to the l1th Circuit
Court of Appeals in Atlanta, which
appointed Jacksonville attorney John Mills
to the case. But the 11th Circuit also refused
to release him.
Mills then appealed to the Supreme Court
asking that it clarify whether its 2001 ruling
applies to foreign nationals stopped at the
border.
"The statute that Congress enacted to
authorize detention of an alien after removal
only authorizes temporary detention," Mills
said. "The only question is whether the same
statute should be interpreted more harshly
for Mariel Cubans."
Benitez was at a federal facility in Terre
Haute, Ind., when the Supreme Court agreed
to take his case. "I was watching TV and
heard my name," Benitez recalled, his eye
filling with tears. "I was so excited that I
cried."
Benitez has spent time in various federal
prisons - including a medium-security
facility near Denver, where he talked about
his case, and his life, during a two-hour
interview. Divorced, he has no children.
Born in Havana in 1958, Benitez was largely
raised by his mother after his father died of a
heart attack when he was 10. At age 15, he
said, Cuban police arrested him after he and
a friend held up a market, stealing money,
chickens and a sack of rice.
"My family needed food," Benitez says. "I
wanted to bring food to the house. In Cuba,
we didn't get anything from the
government."
Jehovah's Witness
He said the government denied assistance to
his family because his mother is a Jehovah's
Witness. Many followers of the religion in
Cuba have complained of persecution.
Benitez was still in jail when Mariel
happened in 1980. Benitez, then 22, and
other prisoners were put aboard a boat
whose captain had gone to Mariel to pick up
relatives. The Cuban government loaded
thousands of criminals on the boats.
Benitez said he fondly recalled his first
memory of Key West - a speedboat
whizzing by with a topless woman waving
at the refugees.
"It looked like paradise," said Benitez.
"Then we were given a speech by a military
officer who said 'welcome to the United
States, the land of the free where you will be
free."
The day after his arrival, Benitez was
shipped to the Krome processing center,
where a relative signed him out. A week
later he had a job as a busboy at restaurant.
His family now wants him home.
"We are hoping the Supreme Court will
order his release because there is no greater
violation of human rights than to keep
someone in detention when he has served
his sentence," said Roberto Benitez, 52,
Daniel's older brother in Hialeah.
"He's a very talented man," said Emilio de
la Cal, a Miami attorney who represented
Benitez in South Florida and whose wife is a
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cousin of Benitez. "He came from Cuba,
with no schooling, and now English and
now he speaks English and writes very
well."
Benitez says he regrets having committed
crimes, but should not be kept detained
forever.
"I made mistakes," he said. "But I have paid
my debt to society and I should be free."
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High Court to Consider Detention Case
Justices to Decide if U.S. Can Indefinitely Imprison Criminal Illegal Immigrants
The Washington Post
January 17, 2004
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court announced yesterday
that it will decide whether the federal
government may indefinitely imprison
hundreds of Cubans and other illegal
immigrants who have finished their
sentences for crimes in the United States but
whose home countries cannot or will not
take them back. In a brief order, the court
said it would hear an appeal by Daniel
Benitez, a convicted felon who came to the
United States from Cuba during the 1980
Mariel Boatlift but was never given legal
immigrant status. Benitez has been ordered
out, but the Cuban government has refused
to take him. He has been in U.S. custody for
the past three years, with no end in sight.
In 2001, the Supreme Court interpreted a
1996 immigration law as denying the
government authority to hold any legal
immigrant felon for more than six months, if
deportation proved impossible. It was silent
on the issue of illegal immigrants.
Judith Rabinovitz, senior staff counsel of the
American Civil Liberties Union Immigrant
Rights Project, which supports Benitez, said
the 2001 ruling should apply and that "he's
being subjected to continued imprisonment
without authority."
The Atlanta-based U.S. Court of Appeals for
the I Ith Circuit ruled against Benitez,
deepening a split on the issue among federal
appeals courts. Thus, the Bush
administration also sought a Supreme Court
ruling to settle the question.
In his brief, Solicitor General Theodore B.
Olson urged the court not to apply the 2001
decision to Benitez, lest it create "an
obvious gap in border security that could be
exploited by hostile governments or
organizations that seek to place persons in
the United States for their own purposes."
Though Olson was alluding to the war on
terrorism, the origins of Benitez's case do lie
in an episode that Fidel Castro used to
export some of Cuba's problems to the
United States. The vast majority of the
125,000 Cubans who fled the island in 1980
did so in search of a better life. But once he
saw that the exodus was unstoppable, Castro
emptied Cuba's jails and mental institutions
into the flow.
Under a 1984 agreement with the United
States, Cuba agreed to take back 2,746
criminals and mentally ill people, of whom
1,646 have been returned so far.
A total of 2,269 illegal entrants to the
country are in immigration custody - more
than half of whom have been held for more
than six months, according to the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
The long-term detainees include 920 Mariel
Cubans who were not subject to the 1984
agreement and who, like Benitez, were
never granted legal residency but committed
crimes in the United States.
A 1996 law gives the government the right
to detain deportable immigrants beyond the
usual 90-day "removal period" whenever the
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government determines they would
endanger the community.
But the ambiguities in that law produced the
2001 case, in which the court interpreted the
statute to forbid indefinite detention unless
the government could show a "significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future."
The court added, though, that its decision
would not cover terrorism-related offenses
and that an illegal immigrant "would present
a very different case."
Traditionally, U.S. law has treated illegal
immigrants who have never legally been
admitted to the country as if they were still
standing at the border, seeking admission.
But Benitez's supporters say Mariel Cubans
were granted "parolee" status when they
arrived, which permitted them to live in the
United States even if it is not technically the
same as full legal residency.
"There will be a question whether that
fiction is enough to say they can be locked
up for the rest of their lives," Rabinovitz
said.
Benitez was convicted of grand theft in
Florida in 1983. As a result, he was denied
an application for legal residence.
In April 1993, he pleaded guilty to armed
robbery, armed burglary and weapons
violations, accepting a sentence of 20 years.
Released from state prison in 2001, he was
transferred to immigration authorities.
The case is Benitez v. Wallis, 03-7434. The
court ordered expedited consideration of the
case, so oral arguments will take place in
April and a decision is likely by July.
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Mariel Felons Remain Stuck in Legal Limbo
The Miami Herald
July 13, 2003
Alfonso Chardy
The worst part of the day is the night.
"That's when I start thinking about what
could have been," says Eustaquio Garcia-
Reyes, a Cuban inmate at the Federal
Correctional Institution here, not far from
Oklahoma City. "I'm ashamed that I
committed a crime and damaged my life. I
had to be punished. But the government now
is keeping me in detention with an endless
sentence, even though I served my time."
Convicted in Miami in 1989 of sexually
abusing two girls, Garcia-Reyes is among
nearly 1,000 Cubans who came to the
United States in the 1980 Mariel boatlift
who are still detained after serving their
criminal sentence.
The U.S. government says it will not release
them because, unlike most other foreign-
born criminals, Cuba will not take them
back.
Held for 10 years, Garcia-Reyes, 47, is
among the longest-detained Mariel felons. A
federal board created to decide whether
Mariel detainees can be released had
repeatedly refused to set him free, citing
reasons not made public. Last year,
however, the panel authorized his release,
but it has been delayed for unspecified
reasons, according to Garcia-Reyes'
attorneys.
Many Mariel refugees were classified as
inadmissible when they arrived, even if they
were physically permitted into the country.
While most went on to become law-abiding
Americans, those who did not become
citizens and were convicted of serious
crimes reverted to inadmissible.
Ongoing Custody
Unless they can be deported, the Mariel
felons can be kept in permanent detention
until the federal review panel determines
that they can be freed, according to the U.S.
government.
In making its decision, the panel takes into
account criminal background, prison
behavior, whether felons have relatives or
friends willing to provide financial support,
mental health and how well they might
adjust outside prison, according to Dan
Kane, a spokesman for the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Even if released, Mariel felons are closely
supervised by federal immigration
authorities and must provide personal
information periodically to a local
immigration office.
Under immigration law, inadmissible
foreigners are generally deemed not entitled
to constitutional guarantees. But U.S.
appeals courts in Michigan and California
have ruled that inadmissible foreigners
should be released because continued
detention violates their rights. Those rulings
have led to the release of an unknown
number of Mariel felons in regions where
those courts have jurisdiction.
In June, the U.S. Supreme Court refused the
federal government's request to take up the
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matter, leaving many Marie] felons,
including those in El Reno, in legal limbo.
"It's a bad situation that goes against
American principles," said Matt Wilch, a
director at Lutheran Immigration and
Refugee Service in Baltimore, which tracks
detained Mariel convicts. "They paid their
debt to society and remain in detention."
Rafael Penalver, a Miami lawyer and an
activist on the issue for decades, also calls
indefinite detention "un-American."
But some advocates of tighter immigration
policies say the federal government should
have the power to indefinitely hold foreign
nationals who are considered a danger to
public safety.
"We know that in the Mariel population,
there were many hardened criminals whom
immigration authorities think is advisable to
hold on to, pending changes in Cuba that
would permit repatriation," said Mark
Krikorian, executive director of the Center
for Immigration Studies, a think tank in
Washington.
Many Released
The federal government has released a
significant number of Mariel detainees who
have completed prison sentences since it
established the Cuban Review Panel in 1987
to evaluate individual cases. Since then, the
number of Mariel detainees has declined
from 7,600 to 988, according to recent
Department of Homeland Security figures.
Garcia-Reyes says he is frustrated that he is
still being held despite the federal panel's
decision last July. Federal officials refuse to
comment on individual cases.
"I still don't really understand what
possessed me to join the exodus," Garcia-
Reyes said in an interview in the visitors
room of the Federal Correctional Institution
at El Reno, a medium-security prison ringed
by barbed-wire-topped fences on U.S.
Highway 66 west of Oklahoma City. "I
simply got carried away, influenced by the
tens of thousands of other people who joined
the exodus."
A soldier in the Cuban army, Garcia-Reyes
was 25 when he and his pregnant wife
boarded a fishing boat in the Cuban port of
Mariel and became part of the 125,000
refugees who headed north.
After immigration officials paroled the
couple into the country, they settled with
relatives in Hialeah. Garcia-Reyes drove
tractor-trailers for a living,
In 1989, Garcia-Reyes was convicted on the
sexual abuse charges involving a 7-year-old
girl and another girl who was under 12. He
was sentenced in Miami-Dade County
criminal court to one year in jail and 10
years of probation, according to court
records.
Shortly after being released, Garcia-Reyes
was arrested for violating probation.
"I didn't have a car or money, and I couldn't
attend the program I had been assigned to in
Coconut Grove," said Garcia-Reyes, who is
divorced from his wife, who has since
remarried and lives in Broward County.
He was sentenced to five years in prison and
was scheduled to be released in 1993. But
because he was an inadmissible foreigner,
he was put into deportation proceedings and
held at a federal facility in Louisiana, where
he told an immigration judge that he wanted
to be deported.
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"I thought that would speed up my release
because I knew I could not be deported to
Cuba," he said.
Ordered Deported
The judge did order him deported, but Cuba
does not take Cuban migrants back, except
those intercepted at sea and 2,746 Marie]
refugees included in a 1984 agreement.
Garcia-Reyes said that when the federal
review panel denied him release in the past,
it cited his "prior conduct," but did not
explain what that meant. Garcia-Reyes said
he was involved in an altercation with
guards at a Louisiana facility after he
refused to put out a cigarette.
Court Ruling
In a landmark 2001 decision, the Supreme
Court ruled that indefinite detention of
foreign nationals raised serious
constitutional concerns regarding the right to
due process. But the court did not specify
whether that right applied to inadmissible
foreigners.
The appeals courts in California and
Michigan, however, narrowly interpreted the
2001 decision and ruled in favor of releasing
inadmissible detainees, including Mariel
felons. They argued that while the high court
suggested that inadmissible foreigners may
have fewer rights, it did not specifically say
that they could be held indefinitely.
But because the Supreme Court declined to
address the issue, the government says it
will continue to detain Mariel felons in parts
of the country in which lower courts have
not favored release.
Victor Manuel Tejeda-Suarez, who has been
held since he finished a three-year sentence
in 1995 on a drug possession charge, said he
would happily return to Cuba.
"I'd go back in a heartbeat," said Tejeda-
Suarez, also held at El Reno. A former crop
farmer in Guantanamo, he said he followed
a friend onto a boat during the Mariel
exodus.
'He said, 'This is our chance,' and I believed
him," Tejeda-Suarez said. "I now deeply
regret that decision."
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Goughnour v. Payton
(03-1039)
Ruling Below: (Payton v. Woodford, 346 F.3d 1204, 9th Cir., 2003)
The court granted defendant's writ for habeas corpus holding that the California Supreme Court
unreasonably applied the established Federal law. The defendant's evidence of conversion to
Christianity as a post-crime mitigating factor for sentencing is allowable and requires more than
just the "catch-all" instruction on mitigation. This court found trial judge erroneously allowed
prosecution to misstate the law in closing arguments.
Question Presented: Did the Ninth Circuit violate 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) when it found the
California Supreme Court objectively unreasonable in holding that California's 'catch-all'
mitigation instruction in capital cases is constitutional as applied to post-crime evidence in
mitigation?
William Charles PAYTON, Petitioner
V.
Jeanne WOODFORD, Warden, Respondent
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided: October 20, 2003
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
PAEZ, Circuit Judge
A California jury convicted William Charles
Payton ("Payton") of the first-degree murder
and rape [...] and sentenced him to death.
Payton appealed his conviction and death
sentence.
Payton filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus [...] after exhausting his state court
remedies.
[...] At issue here is Payton's contention
that the jury did not consider, in imposing
the death penalty, potentially mitigating
evidence of his post-crime religious
conversion [...]. The California death
penalty statute contains an eleven-factor test
that requires the jury to weigh and balance
specific aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in deciding whether to
impose the death penalty. The first ten
factors instruct the judge or jury to evaluate
various circumstances specific to the crime
and to account for the defendant's age and
prior convictions. The eleventh factor -
factor (k) - functions as a catch-all factor,
enabling the judge or jury to consider any
other circumstance that the defendant
presents in mitigation of a death sentence.
During Payton's penalty phase, the trial
court used the then-existing model jury
instruction that incorporated this multi-
factor test. [...] Payton contended that,
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although the jury instruction enabled the
jury to consider pre-crime character and
background evidence, see Boyde v.
California, 494 U.S. 370, 108 L. Ed. 2d 316,
110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990), it limited the
permissible scope of factor (k) in such a way
as to remove from the jury's consideration
the only mitigating evidence he presented
during the penalty phase of his trial -
evidence of his post-crime religious
conversion and good behavior in prison.
This opinion ("Payton II") reflects our
decision on remand. Here, we apply the
strict AEDPA standard to our analysis of
Payton's habeas claims and conclude, as we
did in Payton 1, that the district court
properly granted Payton's habeas petition.
Background Information
During the penalty phase [...] the defense
presented eight witnesses, including
Payton's pastor, a deputy sheriff, four
inmates, his mother, and the director of a
religious organization ministering to
prisoners. Their testimony, taken as a whole,
tended to show that Payton had been "born
again," made a sincere commitment to God,
and was performing good works in jail.
Prior to closing arguments in the penalty
phase, the judge held an in-chambers
conference with the attorneys about the jury
instructions. They discussed the application
of the multi-factor instructions [...]. Factor
(k), the eleventh and final factor, directed
that the jury consider "any other
circumstance which extenuates the gravity
of the crime even though it is not a legal
excuse for the crime." CALJIC 8.84.1.
Payton's counsel sought an amendment to
the instruction that expressly would have
directed the jury to consider "evidence of
the defendant's character, background,
history, mental condition and physical
condition."
During closing argument, the prosecutor
argued to the jury that factor (k) applied to
"some factor at the time of the offense that
somehow operates to reduce the gravity for
what the defendant did" but that it did not
"refer to anything after the fact or later." He
asserted that factor (k) did not encompass
Payton's conversion to Christianity and
good conduct in jail because they occurred
"well after the fact of the crime." and the
factor "seems to refer to a fact in operation
at the time of the offense."
In response to the prosecutor's factor (k)
argument, the defense moved for a mistrial,
objecting that the prosecutor's argument was
"completely contrary to what we all agreed
in chambers on the record 'k' was designed
to apply to." The court responded that it was
a "fair comment on either side" and "I think
you can argue it either way." The court told
the jury "the comments by both the
prosecution and the defense are not
evidence. You've heard the evidence and, as
I said, this is argument. And it's to be placed
in its proper perspective."
The jury returned a verdict of death.
DISCUSSION
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Payton filed his habeas petition on May 6,
1996, after the effective date of AEDPA. In
light of Woodford v. Garceau, AEDPA
therefore applies to our analysis of Payton's
habeas claims.
The California Supreme Court, in a
published opinion, addressed the meits of
Payton's factor (k) claims and concluded
that there was no instructional error at trial.
* * *
We hold that the California Supreme Court
unreasonably applied "clearly established"
Supreme Court precedent to the facts of this
case.
Controlling Supreme Court Precedent
Supreme Court precedent in force at the
time the California Supreme Court decided
Payton's factor (k) arguments required that
all potentially relevant mitigating evidence -
pre-crime and post-crime - be available to
the sentencer in a capital case. "Moreover,
Eddings makes clear that it is not enough
simply to allow the defendant to present
mitigating evidence to the sentencer. The
sentencer must also be able to consider and
give effect to that evidence in imposing
sentence." (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court had occasion to analyze
the factor (k) instruction at issue here in
Boyde v. California. Specifically, the Court
addressed "whether petitioner's capital
sentencing proceedings violated the Eighth
Amendment because the trial court
instructed the jury in accordance with
former CALJIC 8.84.1, including the
'unadorned' factor (k)." 494 U.S. at 377.
Boyde contended that factor (k) did not
allow the jury to consider and give effect to
non-crime-related mitigating evidence, such
as his impoverished and deprived childhood
and difficulties in school, because the
instruction limited the jury to considering
only evidence related to the crime. [...]
Applying this standard to factor (k),
"standing alone," the Court concluded that
"there is not a reasonable likelihood that
Boyde's jurors interpreted the trial court's
instructions to prevent consideration of
mitigating evidence of background and
character."
The California Supreme Court addressed
Payton's argument that "the trial court's
instructions and the prosecutor's argument
led the jurors to believe, incorrectly, that
they were not permitted to consider [his]
mitigating evidence." The court
acknowledged that the Eighth Amendment
requires the sentencer in a capital case to
consider evidence of character and
background, including "good behavior in
prison." In analyzing Payton's claims,
however, it focused entirely on the Supreme
Court's decision in Boyde, which was an
unreasonable application of "clearly
established" Supreme Court precedent
because Boyde does not control this case
and, in focusing almost exclusively on
Boyde, the court did not give proper effect to
clearly established Supreme Court cases
such as Skipper and Penry that are
controlling here.
Boyde did not address the question presented
here - whether, on its face, the unadorned
factor (k) instruction is unconstitutionally
ambiguous as applied to post-crime
evidence. [...] Natural reading of the words
of the unadorned factor (k) does not support
the inclusion of post-crime evidence [...].
Boyde's conclusions about the plain wording
of factor (k) and the instruction's obvious
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inclusion of pre-crime background evidence
therefore do not apply in this case.
Whereas the prosecutor in Boyde conceded
that the jury must consider Boyde's
mitigating character and background
evidence, the prosecutor here repeatedly
stated to the jury that factor (k) did not
encompass Payton's mitigating evidence of
his religious conversion and good behavior
in prison.
After the court overruled the defense
attorney's objection to the legal
misstatements in the prosecutor's argument,
the prosecutor continued arguing to the jury.
He then specifically told the jury that it had
not "heard anything to mitigate what
[Payton's] done" and that Payton's only
mitigating evidence did not fit into factor
(k).
The California Supreme Court recognized
that the prosecutor "suggested a narrow and
incorrect interpretation of factor (k)," but it
reasoned that "any impact this argument
may have had . . . was immediately blunted
by defense counsel's objection, which led
the court to remind the jury that lawyers'
comments were 'not evidence' but
'argument,' and 'to be placed in [their]
proper perspective."'
According to Boyde, "the arguments of
counsel, like the instructions of the court,
must be judged in the context in which they
are made." In Boyde, the factor (k)
instruction potentially was ambiguous but
the prosecutor correctly stated in his
argument that the jury must consider
Boyde's mitigating character and
background evidence, thus clarifying the
scope of the instruction. Here, however [.. .
the prosecutor s erroneous argument was far
from subtle. It was explicit, deliberate,
consistent, and repeated. [...I A lay jury is
ill-equipped to determine which view of the
law is correct. [.. .] ("When jurors have been
left the option of relying upon a legally
inadequate theory, there is no reason to think
that their own intelligence and expertise will
save them from that error."); Penry, 492
U.S. at 328 [... ].
In this context, there was a reasonable
likelihood that, as a result of the
prosecutor's legally erroneous arguments
and the court's failure to correct the
arguments with proper jury instructions, the
jury did not consider and give effect to the
post-crime mitigating evidence of Payton's
religious conversion and good behavior in
prison. This was constitutional error.
In light of our conclusion that there was
constitutional error, we must now decide
whether this error was harmless. We hold
that the error was not harmless because it
had a "substantial and injurious effect or
influence" on the jury's verdict.
The state must provide us with a 'fair
assurance' that the error was harmless under
Brecht. [...] Only if the State has persuaded
us that there was no substantial and injurious
effect on the verdict do we find the error
harmless.
We cannot know whether the jury would
have returned a verdict of life or of death
had it been properly instructed. Payton's
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extensive evidence of his conversion to
Christianity, positive influence on other
inmates, and other good works in jail were
offered to evoke to the jury his potential for
rehabilitation. [...] Far from a fair assurance
that the error was harmless, the "possible
jury confusion" arising from the trial court
instruction leaves us in "grave doubt about
the likely effect of [the] error on the jury's
verdict." We therefore conclude that the
instructional error had a "substantial and
injurious effect or influence on the jury's
verdict" that necessitates a new penalty
phase trial.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of
the district court granting Respondent's
motion for summary judgment as to all
claims except Claim IVB, item 3 of the
petition for habeas corpus, and granting the
writ of habeas corpus as to the penalty phase
of the trial.
AFFIRMED.
DISSENT; TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:
The majority holds that the California
Supreme Court unreasonably applied
Supreme Court precedent in upholding
Payton's sentence of death. In order for the
majority to reach this conclusion, it must
have decided that the California Supreme
Court's holding was "more than incorrect or
erroneous," for the "unreasonable
application" clause of § 2254(d)(1) means
"objectively unreasonable." [...]
Did the California Supreme Court
unreasonably apply United States Supreme
Court precedent? Certainly not.
The California Supreme Court explicitly
acknowledged the Eighth Amendment
requirement that a sentencing jury in a
capital case consider mitigating character
and background evidence. [...] The
California Supreme Court concluded that it
was not "reasonably likely that the jurors
believed the law required them to disregard
[Payton's] mitigating evidence." In other
words, the California Supreme Court
determined that Payton's jury heard and
considered Payton's mitigating evidence
before deciding that death was warranted.
The California Supreme Court's application
of the Boyde decision was not only
reasonable but correct. In Boyde, the United
States Supreme Court upheld against an
Eighth Amendment challenge the same
CALJIC jury instruction employed in
Payton's penalty trial. The central issue in
Boyde, as in Payton's case, was whether
factor (k)'s language limits the jury to
consideration of evidence only directly
related to the crime. The United States
Supreme Court emphatically rejected such a
reading. [...]
Though perhaps it could have, the California
Supreme Court did not cite to Boyde and end
its analysis. Recognizing that "Boyde does
not prevent a defendant from asserting a
claim to the effect that prosecutorial
argument, or other factors, led the jury to
misinterpret factor (k)," the court took pains
to explain that no misinterpretation occurred
here.
First of all, the court stated that the impact
of the prosecutor's erroneous argument (that
post-crime mitigating evidence should not
be considered by the jury) was "blunted" by
defense counsel's objection and the trial
court's admonition to the jury that counsels'
arguments were not evidence. Payton, 839
P.2d at 1048. Second, the court noted that
the prosecutor's own statements lessened the
impact of the erroneous argument. "The
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prosecutor implicitly conceded the relevance
of [Payton's] mitigating evidence by
devoting substantial attention to it." Third,
and perhaps most significant, the court
explained that the jury was unlikely to
ignore Payton's mitigating evidence -
regardless of the ambiguous factor (k)
instruction or the prosecutor's arguments -
since doing so would have turned the
penalty phase "into a virtual charade."
The trial court's admonition to consider all
the evidence buoyed the conclusion that the
jury considered Payton's mitigating
evidence. Finally, the court noted that
Payton's attorney, "in his own closing
argument, strongly reinforced the correct
view that [Payton's] religious conversion
was proper mitigating evidence." [...].
How that decision constitutes an
unreasonable application of United States
Supreme Court precedent is a mystery to
me. The California Supreme Court identified
the correct governing rule - that mitigating
background and character evidence may not
be precluded from the sentencing jury's
consideration - and then decided that the
rule was not violated. [...].
Apparently Boyde was the wrong case to
apply, for the majority tells us that [...] the
California Supreme Court was unreasonable
because it "did not give proper effect to
clearly established Supreme Court cases
such as Skipper v. South Carolina and Penry
v. Lynaug that are controlling here."
Neither Skipper nor Penry supports the
proposition that the California Supreme
Court erred, let alone unreasonably applied
clearly established federal law. Both cases
are plainly distinguishable from the case at
bar. In Skipper, the trial court excluded as
irrelevant defense witnesses who would
have testified that the defendant had "made
a good adjustment" while in prison. Payton,
in contrast, was not precluded from calling
such character witnesses. In fact, Payton
called eight witnesses who all testified that
Payton had discovered God while in jail.
Unlike the instructions in Penry, which on
their face precluded the jury from
considering the defendant's mitigating
evidence, the instructions here allowed
Payton's jury to consider "any other
circumstance which extenuates the gravity
of the crime even though it is not a legal
excuse for the crime." In Boyde - the case
the majority desperately wants to ignore -
the United States Supreme Court held that
"there is not a reasonable likelihood that
Boyde's jurors interpreted the [unadorned
factor (k) instruction] to prevent
consideration of mitigating evidence of
background and character." Post-Boyde, one
cannot argue that the unadorned factor (k)
instruction is constitutionally deficient on its
face as were the instructions given in Penry.
Penry does not control this case. And it
certainly does not suggest that the California
Supreme Court unreasonably applied United
States Supreme Court precedent when it
extended Boyde to post-crime mitigation
evidence.
Moreover, as both the Boyde Court and the
majority's opinion here recognize, factor (k)
allows jurors to consider a defendant's
character. And that is basically what
Payton's attorney tried to show during the
penalty phase - that Payton had undergone a
character transformation after being jailed.
[...] As the Boyde Court noted:
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Jurors do not sit in solitary isolation booths
parsing instructions for subtle shades of
meaning in the same way that lawyers
might. Differences among them in
interpretation of instructions may be
thrashed out in the deliberative process, with
commonsense understanding of the
instructions in the light of all that has taken
place at the trial likely to prevail over
technical hairsplitting. Unfortunately for
Payton, the jury either did not believe this
miracle on the cellblock or did not value it
much in comparison to the horrific crimes
he committed.
Perhaps I am wrong and the majority is
correct that Boyde is distinguishable from
this case because it concerned pre-crime
mitigation evidence. But even so, I am at a
loss to understand how the California
Supreme Court unreasonably applied any
United States Supreme Court precedent. [... I
We do not have the right to ignore AEDPA,
however much our personal sense of justice
urges us to overturn Payton's sentence. We
are not Congress. We are not the United
States Supreme Court.
Reasonable minds might disagree as to
whether Payton's sentence was based on
constitutionally adequate jury instructions,
especially considering the prosecutor's
erroneous arguments to the jury. But that is
not the question before us. For us to grant
Payton's petition, the California Supreme
Court's decision must have been objectively
unreasonable, which means "more than
incorrect or erroneous. Under this standard it
was not. [...]
We turn to the question of harmless error,
which the majority hastily jettisons. The
prosecutor may have been wrong in urging
the jury to disregard the defendant's post-
arrest claim of religious conversion, but we
must not forget the factual context in which
the jury rendered its decision. [...]
While everyone else in the house was fast
asleep, Payton repaid Pensinger for her
hospitality by waking her with two blows to
her back, stabbing her forty times [ ...]
stabbing her ten-year-old son, Blaine,
twenty-three times [...] Pamela
Montgomery [...] was found after Payton
fled the Pensinger residence. [...] Forensic
evidence suggested either that Payton
stabbed Montgomery twelve times during
sexual intercourse, or that he raped her while
she lay comatose and bleeding to death from
her wounds.
Had Payton changed by the time of his trial
and sentencing? Who knows? We do know
that the jury heard evidence of his post-
crime religious conversion. The conversion
may have counted for something, but it was
up to a jury two decades ago to decide how
to value his fortuitous epiphany. Certainly,
there might have been substantial doubt
concerning Payton's sincerity given the
timing of his religious conversion, but even
if his commitment were sincere, the jury
may very well have concluded that such
matters concerned Payton's soul, not his life.
Our job today is to ask: "Do [we, as judges],
think that the error substantially influenced
the jury's decision?" Common sense tells us
the answer is no.
Twelve jurors listened to Payton's evidence
in mitigation and determined it was not
sufficient to avoid a sentence of death.
Twelve judges carefully examined the
penalty phase instructions and found them to
be constitutionally adequate. Six judges
disagree. Objectively, who is being
unreasonable?
353
California Death Penalty Law at Issue
Los Angeles Times
May 25, 2004
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court said Monday that it
would decide whether California's death
penalty law wrongly prevented jurors from
considering a killer's conversion to
Christianity as a reason for sparing his life.
The outcome could determine the fate of
several death row inmates whose
convictions came in the early 1980s.
On May 26, 1980, William C. Payton went
to a Garden Grove home where he had
previously been a boarder and asked to sleep
on the couch. A few hours later, he raped
and murdered a woman who was living
there. He then repeatedly stabbed the
woman who owned the home, as well as her
10-year-old son. They survived to testify
against him. Payton was convicted, and a
jury sentenced him to death.
The Supreme Court has said that defendants
have a right to tell jurors anything about
themselves that may call for mercy. All
Payton's lawyer could say was that after
Payton was behind bars, the inmate had been
"born again" and had led fellow prisoners in
Bible study classes. His pastor, his mother
and several others testified about the
sincerity of his religious conversion.
Under California law, the judge instructed
the jurors on what they could consider when
weighing whether to impose the death
penalty or a life sentence without parole.
The final instruction said jurors could
consider "any other circumstance which
extenuates the gravity of his crime."
In his appeals, Payton argued that this
instruction focused the jurors' attention on
his crime, not on his religious conversion in
prison.
The California Supreme Court and a federal
judge dismissed his claim. But the U.S.
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 6-5
decision, sided with Payton and set aside his
death sentence.
State prosecutors appealed, saying the 9th
Circuit's ruling was wrong and could upset
other death sentences.
"This has already affected one case, and it
has a potential effect on several others," said
A. Natalia Cortina, a state deputy attorney
general in San Diego.
In the mid-1980s, however, the state revised
the jury instruction to make clear that "any
sympathetic" fact could be weighed as a
reason to choose a life sentence, rather than
death.
Nonetheless, the high court will hear the
case of Goughnour vs. Payton to decide
whether the earlier jury instruction was
unreasonable and unconstitutional.
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Legal Pingpong and a Condemned Man
Los Angeles Times
May 25, 2000
Jerry Hicks
William Charles Payton had left blood
everywhere.
It was a crime scene to shock even the most
hardened police investigators. A young
woman dead, raped and then stabbed a
dozen times. Another woman, who
miraculously survived, stabbed more than 40
times. Her 10-year-old son, who also
survived, stabbed 23 times.
That horror in a Garden Grove tenant house
came 20 years ago this Friday. And there's a
chance that it might all be relived in a
courtroom once again.
Payton, now 46, has Orange County's
longest death sentence appeal-just over 18
years. Right now, he's got the upper hand.
A year ago this week, U.S. District Judge
Manuel Real, reviewing a long laundry list
of appeal issues presented by Payton's
attorneys, rejected all but one. But one is all
it takes. The federal judge ordered a new
penalty trial for Payton.
The judge found that the prosecutor, Deputy
Dist. Atty. Mike Jacobs, had erred at
Payton's trial by telling jurors they shouldn't
consider Payton's jailhouse conversion to
God because it came after the murder. The
state Supreme Court had previously ruled
that Jacobs made a mistake but found it
"harmless error." The trial judge, that court
said, had given elaborate instructions to
jurors on what they could consider,
including witnesses who testified to
Payton's jail ministry.
But Judge Real found it not so harmless.
Now the state attorney general's office is
vigorously fighting Real's ruling. It formally
filed its own appeal before the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals this month.
"I'm confident we will get this straightened
out," said Deputy Atty. Gen. Esteban
Hernandez, who's been assigned the Payton
case for 10 years. "And if we do, I think
Payton will finally be on the fast track
toward execution."
And if Payton wins? Prosecutor Jacobs said
he will retry the penalty phase.
"This office is committed to Mr. Payton's
execution," said Jacobs. "If it takes another
20 years, we will not give up on Mr.
Payton."
Have we reached a point where it's not
worth it? After all, Payton's religious
conversion would certainly be a major factor
at any retrial. He's had 18 years of
ministering on death row.
Jacobs' answer: "You wouldn't ask that if
you had seen the crime scene. It's just the
most horrid crime you can imagine. There is
nothing Payton can do to mitigate that
crime."
On May 26, 1980, Patricia Pensinger had
been up with her restless 10-year-old son,
Blaine, at 4 a.m. While the boy went to sleep
in her bed, she sat in the kitchen working a
crossword puzzle.
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Suddenly, in walked Payton, a former
tenant, who had retained a house key. His
car had broken down, he said, and he
wondered if he could sleep on her couch.
A moment later, Pamela Montgomery, 21,
entered the kitchen for a glass of water.
She'd been living there only two days, while
her young Navy husband was off on sea
duty.
They all returned to bed soon after. Two
hours later, Montgomery was dead.
Pensinger felt two thuds to her back,
according to her court testimony, and saw
Payton standing above her with a butcher
knife. Both she and her son were savagely
attacked.
Payton then left for the kitchen, perhaps for
a second knife. With a mother's courage,
Pensinger yelled at her son that she would
keep Payton busy in the kitchen to give
Blaine time to escape. That resulted in more
stabbings to the landlady. But Blaine was
stabbed again too as he tried to flee the
house.
Payton finally returned to his own home to
clean up, and told his wife (now his ex) he
had to go on the run. He was arrested in
Florida a month later.
Payton offered no defense at the guilt phase
of his trial. At the penalty phase, he relied
on testimony of other inmates, and a jail
deputy, about his religious conversion. He
was known at the Orange County Jail as
"Bible Billy."
Jacobs put on the witness stand a woman
who had suffered a previous attack by
Payton. Deputy Atty. Gen. Hernandez says
it's that woman who has remained in touch
with him over the years, terrified that Payton
might someday be released.
A few years ago, when I was interviewing
two other death row inmates at San Quentin,
Payton wandered by to say hello. He had
declined my request for an interview but
wanted to assure me it wasn't personal; he
was under orders from his attorneys.
In our brief exchange, Payton said he was so
at peace with God that he was ready for
whatever his fate might be. He knows he
attacked the three, he said. But he's fighting
the death penalty because he has no memory
of what happened, and that should have been
brought out at his trial.
Payton's original trial attorney, James
Merwin, became the principal target of his
appellate attorneys. They argued Merwin
should have presented a post-traumatic
stress disorder, or PTSD, defense based on
Payton's shocking combat experiences in
Vietnam.
From Payton's psychiatrist, H.R. Kormos:
"Several times daily Mr. Payton went on
helicopter missions. His unit encountered
enemy activity routinely. . . . For many of
these helicopter crews these operations
amounted to suicide missions."
And more: "While firing his machine gun
Mr. Payton saw enemy tracer bullets coming
right at him, and then he was knocked out by
a round. He fully expected death, but when
he came to, he discovered to his amazement
that his flak jacket had stopped the bullet."
Based in great part on Kormos' report, the
state Supreme Court ordered a hearing on
the PTSD issue back in Orange County.
Payton suffered PTSD all right: Payton's
Tale a Sad Distortion. Apparently his
religious conversion includes only nine of
the Ten Commandments.
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Military records, acknowledged in court
documents, showed that Payton served only
22 days in Vietnam, and in a noncombat
mechanic's role. He washed out and was
sent back to the U.S. because of drug
problems.
I tried without luck the past two weeks to
locate Blaine Pensinger, now 30. Jacobs and
Hernandez aren't sure where he is either.
But you have to wonder, 20 years after the
crime, how difficult it will be for him to
return to the courtroom and go through it all
once again.
Here's a look at Death Row inmate William
Charles Payton's 20-year serpentine route
through the criminal justice system.
* May 26, 1980: Payton rapes and murders
Pamela Montgomery, 21, at the Garden
Grove home where she's renting a room. He
also repeatedly stabs the landlord and her
10-year-old son in another room, but they
survive.
* Nov. 19, 1981: After just 90 minutes of
deliberation, a jury returns a death verdict
against Payton.
* March 9, 1982: Superior Court Judge
Donald A. McCartin sentences Payton to
death. A few days later he is sent to San
Quentin's Death Row, to await resolution of
his appeal.
* July 20, 1983: Payton's attorneys file their
first brief with the state Supreme Court.
* 1983-1986: Both sides file several
supplemental briefs with the high court.
* 1986: Payton's attorneys file a petition
with the state Supreme Court arguing that
his trial attorney, James Merwin, should
have used a Vietnam post-traumatic stress
syndrome (PTSD) defense at the penalty
phase of his trial.
* 1988-1989: The state Supreme Court
appoints former appellate justice Robert
Rickles to hear the PTSD issue. After a
hearing process that takes over a year,
Rickles finds that Payton fooled his own
psychiatrist by making up Vietnam
experiences. Payton actually served less than
a month there in a non-combat role.
* Nov. 23, 1992: The state Supreme Court
turns down Payton's appeal.
* Jan. 10, 1994: The U.S. Supreme Court
turns down Payton's appeal.
* April 3, 1996: Payton files a new petition
in U.S. District Court.
* Aug. 2, 1996: U.S. District Court sends
Payton's case back to the state court system
to resolve various issues.
* Oct. 15, 1996: Payton refiles before the
state Supreme Court.
* Dec. 12, 1997: The state Supreme Court
again denies Payton's appeal.
* Feb. 2, 1998: Payton files a new petition in
U.S. District Court.
* Nov. 23, 1998: U.S. District Court agrees
to a hearing on Payton's lawyers claim of
prosecutorial error during closing
arguments.
* May 24, 1999: U.S. District Court Judge
Manuel Real orders a new penalty trial for
Payton based on his claim of prosecutorial
error.
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* Aug. 2, 1999: State attorney general's
office turned down in its attempt to get
Real's order overturned by U.S. District
Court.
* Dec. 27, 1999: State attorney general's
office files notice it will appeal Real's
decision to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
* May 5, 2000: State attorney general
formally appeals to the Ninth Circuit.
* At present: The Ninth Circuit is awaiting
Payton's lawyers' response to the attorney
general's appeal.
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En Banc Ninth Circuit Again Orders New Death Penalty Trial for Killer
Metropolitan News-Enterprise
October 21, 2003
MetNews Staff Writer
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has
ruled, in a second en banc decision, that one
of Orange County's longest-serving Death
Row inmates is entitled to a new penalty
trial.
William Charles Payton was denied his
constitutional right to have all relevant
mitigating evidence considered, the court
said in a 6-5 ruling, because a prosecutor
told jurors they could not consider his
mitigating evidence and the trial judge did
not correct him.
The 6-5 vote was the same as in August of
last year, when the same judges overturned
the ruling of a three-judge panel that the
comments by Deputy District Attorney
Michael Jacobs did not affect Payton's
sentence.
The case was sent back to the en banc panel
by the Supreme Court for reconsideration
under the strict standards for granting of
habeas corpus relief imposed by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act.
The Ninth Circuit had held that AEDPA did
not apply to petitioners, such as Payton, who
requested appointment of habeas counsel but
did not file a petition prior to AEDPA's
effective date. The U.S. Supreme Court
subsequently ruled otherwise in another
case.
The en bane majority, however, concluded
that the California Supreme Court's decision
to affirm Payton's sentence was an
"unreasonable application of controlling
federal law" as set forth in U.S. Supreme
Court rulings, so Payton is entitled to relief,
even under the stricter standard.
Payton was sentenced to die in 1982 for a
1980 rape-murder, accompanied by two
assaults, in Garden Grove. The victims had
been repeatedly stabbed, and investigators
called the crime scene one of the bloodiest
they had ever seen.
The California Supreme Court agreed that
Jacobs had improperly told jurors that the
law did not allow them to consider Payton's
mitigating evidence-that he had undergone
a serious religious conversion and had done
good works in jail. But the judge's error in
allowing the comment was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt because the jury had
been properly instructed, in general terms, to
consider all mitigating evidence, the justices
said in a 5-2 decision.
Justice Joyce L. Kennard and the late Justice
Stanley Mosk dissented as to the death
sentence.
Judge Richard Paez, writing yesterday for
the Ninth Circuit, said the state high court
was wrong. The process, Paez wrote, was
rendered "fundamentally unfair" when the
trial judge not only overruled a defense
objection to Jacobs' remarks, but later
rejected a defense request for a specific
instruction that would have cured the error.
Jurors were given what was then CALJIC
8.84.1, quoting Penal Code Sec. 190.3(k),
the "catch-all" provision on mitigating
evidence. Jurors were told that, in addition
to the specific mitigating factors set out in
the statute, they could consider any
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circumstance "which extenuates the gravity
of the crime even though it is not a legal
excuse for the crime."
Payton's lawyers unsuccessfully asked that
the words "including evidence of the
defendant's character, background, history,
mental condition and physical condition" be
added to the standard instruction.
A year later, the state Supreme Court
suggested in another case that CALJIC
8.84.1 was too ambiguous with respect to
factor (k). The current instruction, CALJIC
8.85(k), advises jurors they may consider
"any sympathetic or other aspect of the
defendant's character or record [that the
defendant offers] as a basis for a sentence
less than death, whether or not related to the
offense for which he is on trial."
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the old
instruction as constitutionally adequate in
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
But Paez distinguished Boyde, saying it
dealt only with pre-crime mitigating
evidence, which jurors would have readily
understood to be covered by the old
instruction. "Boyde did not address the
question presented here-whether, on its
face, the unadorned factor (k) instruction is
unconstitutionally ambiguous as applied to
post-crime evidence."
Rather than affirming on the basis of Boyde,
Paez said, the state high court should have
followed an earlier Supreme Court decision
holding that juries must be permitted to
consider post-crime good behavior as a
mitigating factor.
Paez was joined by Chief Judge Mary M.
Schroeder and Judges Harry Pregerson, A.
Wallace Tashima, William A. Fletcher, and
Marsha S. Berzon.
Judge Richard C. Tallman, joined by Judges
Alex Kozinski, Stephen S. Trott, and
Thomas G. Nelson and Senior Judge
Ferdinand F. Fernandez, dissented.
Tallman accused his colleagues of ignoring
the AEDPA standard. Noting that seven
Ninth Circuit judges-the five dissenters
plus two members of the three-judge
panel-disagreed with the en bane majority,
Tallman wrote:
"Today, six judges of this court announce
that the legal conclusion reached by seven of
their colleagues (plus five justices of the
California Supreme Court) is not only
wrong, but objectively unreasonable in light
of clearly established federal law."
He went on to say:
"The California Supreme Court's
application of the Boyde decision was not
only reasonable but correct."
The majority, he added, "hastily jettisons"
the harmless-error rule.
Payton, he wrote, was such a "vile human
being," and the crimes for which he was
sentenced so horrible, the jury was not likely
to have found his "fortuitous epiphany" to
be sufficiently mitigating even if specifically
told to consider it.
Payton was represented on appeal by Dean
Gits and Rosalie Rakoff. Deputy attorneys
general Nancy Palmieri and Esteban
Hernandez presented the case for the state.
The case is Payton v. Woodford, 00-99000.
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With a 6-5 Split, Ninth Circuit Treads Familiar Ground
The Recorder
October 21, 2003
Jason Hoppin
A sharply divided Ninth U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals overturned a California death
sentence Monday, just hours after the
Supreme Court summarily reversed the
court - again - for not deferring to state
court rulings.
In a 9-0 ruling, the Supreme Court said a
lawyer's description of a client as a "bad
person, lousy drug addict, stinking thief, jail
bird" during closing arguments wasn't per se
ineffective assistance of counsel. It could
have been, as state courts had ruled, an
attempt to build credibility with the jury.
The outcome in Yarborough v. Gentry - like
two Ninth Circuit summary reversals handed
down last term - was a not-too-subtle
reminder to the Ninth Circuit to leave state
rulings alone unless they are "objectively
unreasonable."
But in a 6-5 ruling released Monday, an en
bane Ninth Circuit overturned a 5-2 death
penalty affirmance by the California
Supreme Court. The majority ruled that a
prosecutor's argument could have led the
jury to discount mitigating evidence of the
defendant's religious conversion when it
condemned the convicted rapist and
murderer.
"We have determined that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury accepted
the prosecutor's erroneous statement of the
law rather than the defense counsel's and
that it therefore failed to consider the only
evidence offered in mitigation of the death
penalty," Judge Richard Paez wrote in
Payton v. Woodford.
He was joined by Chief
Schroeder and Judges Harry
Wallace Tashima, William
Marsha Berzon.
Judge Mary
Pregerson, A.
Fletcher and
The dissenting judges wondered how the
state court majority could be termed
"objectively unreasonable" when seven
Ninth Circuit judges - the five dissenters
plus two from the previous three-judge panel
- had agreed with it.
Writing the dissent, Judge Richard Tallman
viewed William Payton s conversion with a
jaundiced eye.
"Abstract legal discussions are important to
the development of the law, but so is the
ability to look at the impact of those abstract
decisions in the context of the real world.
Any legal errors were harmless in relation to
the acts committed by the man who stood
before the jury and asked it to mitigate his
sentence based solely on his change of heart
after he was caught," Tallman wrote.
He was joined by Judges Alex Kozinski,
Stephen Trott, Ferdinand Fernandez and
Thomas G. Nelson. Under the 1996 Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
federal courts reviewing habeas corpus
claims are supposed to defer to state court
rulings, unless the state applied an
objectively unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law. Last year in
Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, the
Supreme Court made clear that "objectively
unreasonable" means more than just
"wrong" - seemingly setting a nearly
insurmountable bar for defendants.
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But also last year, in Miller-El v. Cockrell,
123 S.Ct. 1029, the Supreme Court chided
the Fifth Circuit for failing to oversee state
courts in a case involving the exclusion of
black jurors.
"There the Supreme Court seemed to tell the
Fifth Circuit, 'Hey, you cannot abdicate
completely to the state.' It seems like a very
fine line they're asking courts to walk," said
Vikram Amar, a Hastings College of the
Law professor.
But the Supreme Court has said several
times - unanimously - in little more than a
year that the Ninth Circuit is on the wrong
side of that line.
"The summary reversals show how closely
the Supreme Court watches the 9th Circuit,"
Amar said.
In Gentry, 03 C.D.O.S. 9167, the Supreme
Court cited favorably Judge Andrew
Kleinfeld's dissent from the 9th Circuit's
refusal to rehear that case en banc. Kleinfeld
wrote that under the ineffective assistance
standards his colleagues laid out in Gentry,
Clarence Darrow's closing argument in the
Leopold and Loeb case would have been
deemed deficient.
"To be sure, Gentry's lawyer was no
Aristotle or even Clarence Darrow," the
Supreme Court wrote in its unsigned
opinion. "But the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
- not only that his performance was
deficient, but that any disagreement with
that conclusion would be objectively
unreasonable - gives too little deference to
the state courts that have primary
responsibility for supervising defense
counsel in state criminal trials."
The resemblance of the Supreme Court's
words to Tallman's Payton dissent is
uncanny. Tallman added up the number of
judges who gave the death sentence a stamp
of approval and weighed it against the
majority. Counting the five state Supreme
Court justices, "Twelve judges carefully
examined the penalty phase instructions and
found them to be constitutionally adequate,"
Tallman wrote. "Six judges disagree.
Objectively, who is being unreasonable?"
Actually, 10 judges have disagreed,
including the two dissenters at the California
Supreme Court, the dissenter on the original
three-judge panel, and the district court
judge who first granted Payton's habeas
petition.
Nevertheless, the state will consider
appealing Payton to the Supreme Court.
"We will evaluate it for further review,"
Deputy Attorney General Dane Gillette said.
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